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Globalization has been the topic of much debate and disagreement. On the
one hand, skeptics argue that the world is less economically interdependent than
in prior eras and that globalization is a myth.' On the other hand, those theorists
embracing globalization disagree about what it means. Some argue that it is pri-
marily an economic issue involving the emergence of a global market and global
competition.2 Others argue that it includes an unprecedented transnational and
regional interconnectedness involving economic, social, political, and legal
dimensions?
Despite the contested nature of globalization, international law has clearly
continued to expand its scope and content in ways that even skeptics cannot
deny.' For example, in 1998, the United Nations took the unprecedented step of
establishing the International Criminal Court which has the authority to try indi-
viduals for international crimes even if they were complying with municipal or
domestic laws or orders of their military or civilian superiors? This step symbol-
izes how international law has expanded from a set of legal norms governing
mainly the relations between states to include legal norms which have the
authority to trump municipal or domestic law.' Imposing international legal
norms on internal national affairs suggests that these norms are "universal" or
"global," in some sense. Some commentators argue that these developments
indicate a shift toward a "universal constitutional order."7 Others, like David
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1. DAviD HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND CULTURE 5-7 (1998) [here-
inafter GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS].
2. Id. at 3-5.
3. Id. at 7-10, 14-16.
4. This comment does not mean to suggest that there are not legal theorists who claim that international
law should not properly be considered law. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 209 (2d ed. 1989)
(arguing that international law fails to meet the formal definition of law because it "not only lacks the sec-
ondary rules of change and adjudication which provide for legislature and courts, but also a unifying rule of
recognition specifying 'sources' of law and providing general criteria for the identification of its rules"). But
cf Anthony D'Amato, Is International Law Really "Law"?, 79 Nw. U. L. REv. 1293, 1303 (1984) (arguing
"that international law is really law, by showing that international law is enforceable in the same way that
domestic law is enforceable"); Anthony D'Amato, The Neo-Positivist Concept of International Law, 59 AM. J.
INT'L L. 321 (1965) (setting forth a persuasive critique of Hart's argument).
5. United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, arts. 5, & 33, 37
I.L.M. 999, 1003-04.
6. See infra text accompanying notes 56-65. The term "municipal law" is used in the international law
context to refer to rules of law that "are thought to emanate from national constitutions, municipal statutes,
executive regulations, and the decisions of municipal courts." MARK W. JAN1S, AN INTRODUCTION TO
INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (4th ed. 2003). Note that the term does not narrowly refer to a local municipality or a
city as the term is often used in the United States. It refers to all the sources of law-national, state, and
local-within a particular country. I will use the term "municipal law" in most contexts but will occasionally
use "domestic law" to mean the same thing.
7. See HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 74.
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Held, have referred to these changes in international law "as an emerging frame-
work of cosmopolitan law . . . which circumscribes and delimits the political
power of individual states."' In other words, there is a sense in which interna-
tional law has become more global or cosmopolitan so that it provides an
autonomous set of legal norms that can protect individual rights and adjudicate
conflicts among countries on an objective basis.
Alternatively, David Kennedy maintains that the current ideas about public
international law have evolved from a questionable account of the origins and
development of international law? Although challenging this account and exag-
gerating its claims somewhat, he comments that
[i]ntemational legal scholars are particularly insistent that their
discipline began in 1648 with the Treaty of Westphalia closing
the Thirty Years' War. The originality of 1648 is important to
the discipline, for it situates public international law as rational
philosophy, handmaiden of statehood, the cultural heir to reli-
gious principle .... Before 1648 were facts, politics, religion, in
some tellings a "chaotic void" slowly filled by sovereign states.
Thereafter, after the establishment of peace, after the "rise of
states," after the collapse of "religious universalism," after the
chaos of war, came law-as philosophy, as idea, as word.°
Kennedy pejoratively suggests that from its inception, the idea of international
law has been associated with a movement beyond "the inadequacies of religion"
(i.e., religion produces war not peace) to a rational notion of law to govern the
relations among the evolving nation-states." In this account, religion is "some-
thing we used to have" which "begins as a social force, is transformed into a
'philosophy' [natural law theory] and survives only as a set of 'principles,' guid-
ing the practice of institutions." 12 By the end of the traditional period (1648-
1918), these principles are no longer legitimated by natural law but by a posi-
tivist account of sovereign consent.13 Subsequently, in the modem era, the focus
has shifted to the pragmatic application of doctrinal principles and the interna-
tional institutions that make this possible. Moreover, Kennedy charges that this
8. David Held, Regulating Globalization?, in Ti GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE GLOBALIZATION DEBATE 420, 426 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000) [hereinafter THE
GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER].
9. David Kennedy, A New Stream ofInternational Law Scholarship, 7 Wis. INT'L L. J. 1, 12-28 (1988).
10. Id. at 14 (empahsis added). Kennedy maintains that the "goal in this historical work has been to unsettle
the confidence of twentieth century international law in its ability to transcend and supplant the difficulties and
contradictions of philosophy through pragmatic and functional structures." Id. at 28.
11. Id. at 19.
12. Id. at 18, 19.
13. Id. at 22.
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problematic account of international law maintains that international law, in a
sense, takes the place of religion with an "essentially ecumenical and anti-imper-
ial" universality.1 4
Should international law take the place of religion? Should it provide a com-
prehensive conviction about authentic human existence? If international law is a
form of comprehensive liberalism, this would be true. It would also partially
explain the charge by some religious groups that international human rights
treaties have a "Western bias" or are ethnocentric.16 Alternatively, the conven-
tional account of international law's history parallels the story that Max Weber
tells about the increasing rationalization of Western culture which has "disen-
chanted the world." 7 Since the Enlightenment, the world can no longer be
viewed as an integrated meaningful whole under a comprehensive religious or
metaphysical worldview, and law can no longer be legitimized by its religious or
metaphysical foundations. Law is autonomous and must have its own indepen-
dent rational justification. Can international law do without religion? Does
international law provide a determinate set of legal norms to resolve internation-
al disputes that are independent of religious convictions?
John Rawls has argued that the "Law of Peoples" can provide a public politi-
cal conception of justice to support a determinate set of international legal norms
which are independent of comprehensive doctrines. After setting forth my
assumptions about legal indeterminacy, international law, and religion, I will
show that Rawls's "political, not metaphysical" Law of Peoples depends on a
comprehensive conviction. This means that the Law of Peoples would have to
establish an official comprehensive conviction to be effective. As a result,
Rawls's "political, not metaphysical" theory incoherently becomes "metaphysi-
cal, not political."
14. Id. at 23. This account is not to suggest that others do not argue for an essential relationship between
international law and religion. See, e.g., RICHARD FALK, RELIGION AND HUMANE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 11
(2001) (begins exploring "a form of reconstructive postmodernism [theory of international relations], that is, a
post-Westphalian perspective that is informed by ethical values and spiritual belief"); MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE
IDEA OF HUMAN RIGHTS: FoUR INQUIRIES 29 (1998) (arguing that "if-the conviction that every human being is
sacred is inescapably religious, it follows that the idea of human rights is ineliminably religious, because the
conviction is an essential, even foundational, constituent of the idea"). See also Franklin I. Gamwell, The
Moral Ground of Cosmopolitan Democracy, 83 J. RELIGION 562 (2003) (arguing that human rights in the con-
text of a cosmopolitan or global democracy must be justified by a comprehensive moral ground (the divine
good) because consent or a social contract alone is inadequate); RELIGION AND INTERNATIONAL LAW (Mark W.
Janis & Carolyn Evans eds., 1999); THE INFLUENCE OF RELIGION ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
(Mark W. Janis, ed., 1991); Richard Ashcraft, RELIGION AND LOCKEAN NATURAL RIGHTS, IN RELIGIOUS
DIVERSITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 195, 196 (Irene Bloom et al. eds., 1996) (arguing that John Locke rejected the
common Western assumption (which is often attributed to him) that "in any general discussion of individual
rights" that "religion is one of the least important explanatory factors to be considered").
15. John Rawls has recently noted that the idea of a well ordered society set forth in A Theory of Justice was
unrealistic because it required citizens to adopt a "comprehensive liberalism" (which is unrealistic to expect) in
order for a just society to be stable. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM xvii (paperback ed. 1996) [hereinafter
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM]. In other words, A Theory of Justice proposed a "comprehensive liberalism"
whereas POLITICAL LIBERALISM proposes a "political liberalism."
16. See, e.g., David Little et al., Human Rights and the World's Religions: Christianity, Islam, and
Religious Liberty, in RELIGIOUS DIVERSITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 213, 236 (Irene Bloom et al. eds., 1996) (chal-
lenging claims that the right to freedom of conscience and religion is ethnocentric by showing that both
Christianity and Islam "share a common framework within which to think about freedom of conscience and
religious liberty").
17. MAX WEBER, FROM MAX WEBER 155 (H. H. Gerth & C. W. Mills eds., 1958).
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To the contrary, I will argue that international law needs religion because it
is indeterminate and that international law should not attempt to resolve legal
indeterminancy because this would require establishing an official international
religion. Given the limitations of this article, however, I will not attempt to pro-
vide a comprehensive normative and descriptive account of law and international
law to support this claim."8 My more modest expectations are to provide a nor-
mative theory of law to justify the interpretation of international law in cases in
which international law is indeterminate. To support this argument, I will pri-
marily focus on the hypothetical application of international legal norms by
judges rather than by other public officials such as executives, or by private
actors. Even though there are few international and regional tribunals, the con-
text of judicial decision making helpfully brings to light the difficult issues
raised by legal indeterminacy. By focusing on this hypothetical judicial decision
making, I hope to make it clear that comprehensive or religious convictions are
necessary for fully justifying the interpretation and application of international
law when it is indeterminate. Assuming that interpreting and applying interna-
tional law in hard cases for other purposes, such as foreign relations, treaty nego-
tiations, or international business transactions, is, in principle, the same as for
judicial decision making, this argument can then be extended to interpreting and
applying international law in these other contexts as well. In addition, the
promise of cosmopolitan law will likely depend on further developing intema-
tional legislative, administrative, and judicial capacities. In order for these legal
functions to be effective, demythologizing the autonomy of international law
will be an important factor to take into account.
In explicating a normative theory of international law, I will assume that
interpreting and applying international law involves two stages-deliberation
and explanation-which do not necessarily mirror one another. Contrary to the
current conception of international law, my heretical thesis is two-fold: (1) legal
interpreters should fully justify their interpretations of international law by rely-
ing on their religious or comprehensive convictions in their deliberation about
hard cases; but (2) judges and other public officials should only partially justify
their decisions in their written opinions by explaining their decisions in terms of
legal norms and noncomprehensive extra-legal norms. The first thesis focuses
on all interpreters of international law, official or not, and argues that they
should fully justify their interpretations based on their comprehensive convic-
tions to provide international law with a "universal" justification. With respect
to this second thesis, I am focusing on judges and other public officials and argu-
ing that in their official written opinions or official actions such as treaty making,
international law should remain indeterminate. International law should not
adopt comprehensive convictions but only noncomprehensive legal and extra-
legal norms. This leaves the official text of international law indeterminate so
that a plurality of comprehensive convictions can inform international law.
18. The descriptive account helps us understand how analytically we can talk about law as something dis-
tinct from other forms of practical reasoning such as morality and politics. It also describes how the normative
justification occurs in the legal system. By contrast, the normative account of law provides a justification or
legitimation of the law and the legal system (including judicial decision making).
[VOL. 22:263
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Religious convictions are thus the silent prologue to any full justification of hard
cases. The demands of full justification in hard cases reintroduces religious con-
victions into the justification of international law and thereby reenchants interna-
tional law.
I. THE NATURE OF RELIGION, INTERNATIONAL, LAW AND LEGAL INDETERMINANCY
This Section will first set forth a definition of religion. It will then specify
what I mean by legal indeterminancy. Subsequently, it will articulate my
descriptive assumptions about the nature of international law and indicate how
the advent of legal indeterminancy raises important normative issues for interna-
tional law that have not been satisfactorily resolved.
A. A Formal Definition of Religion"
Regarding the definition of religion, I will adopt Schubert Ogden's definition
of religion as "the primary form of culture in terms of which we human beings
explicitly ask and answer the existential question of the meaning of ultimate real-
ity for us."2 According to this account, religion explicitly asks what is "authen-
tic human existence" or "how we are to understand ourselves and others in rela-
tion to the whole."21 The existential question, the question of meaning, is the
question which is presupposed by all other questions. It is the comprehensive
question concerning "what is the valid comprehensive self-understanding" or
"comprehensive human purpose."2 Religion explicitly answers the existential or
comprehensive question by providing the "concepts and symbols whose express
function is to mediate authentic self-understanding."23 In other words, religion
includes a comprehensive evaluation of human activity in terms of the nature of
existence to determine "how human activity as such ought to make a difference
to the larger reality of which it is a part." 4
If the existential or comprehensive question is presupposed by all other ques-
tions, does that mean that answering any question (such as which party should
win a lawsuit) presupposes an answer to the existential question? Yes and no.
Ogden argues that "everything that we think, say, or do, insofar, at least, as it
makes or implies a claim to validity, necessarily presupposes that ultimate reality
19. For further discussion of the issues involved in defining religion, see MARK MODAK-TRURAN,
REENCHANTING THE LAW: THE RELIGIOUS DIMENSION OF JUDICIAL DECISION MAKING 19-28 (unpublished Ph.D.
Dissertation, University of Chicago, 2002) (on file with author) [hereinafter MODAK-TRURAN, REENCHANTING
THE LAW].
20. SCHUBERT M. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE TRUE RELIGION OR ARE THERE MANY? 5 (1992) (emphasis
added) [hereinafter ODGEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE].
21. Id. at 6.
22. FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, THE MEANING OF RELIGIOUS FREEDOM: MODERN POLITICS AND DEMOCRATIC
RESOLUTION 22-23 (1995). Gamwell further recognizes that his "definition and discussion of religion is noth-
ing other than an attempt to appropriate [Ogden's] formulations for the purposes of the present inquiry." Id. at
15 n.1. Cf Steven D. Smith, Legal Discourse and the De Facto Disestablishment, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 203, 216
(1998) (claiming that "what we call 'religion' typically amounts to a comprehensive way of perceiving and
understanding life and the world; it affects everything.") (emphasis added).
23. OGDEN, IS THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 20, at 8.
24. GAMWELL, supra note 22, at 25.
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is such as to authorize some understanding of ourselves as authentic and that,
conversely, some understanding of our existence is authentic because it is autho-
rized by ultimate reality."2 Consequently, in a sense, answering any question
implies an understanding of what constitutes authentic human existence or an
answer to the comprehensive or existential question. However, Franklin
Gamwell notes that this does not mean that all human activity is religious but
that "the character of human activity as such implies the possibility of religion,
in the sense that it implies the comprehensive question and, therefore, the possi-
bility that this question is asked and answered explicitly."26 Human activity is
thus religious only to the extent that the existential or comprehensive question
has been explicitly asked and answered.
To differentiate between explicitly answering and implicitly "answering" the
comprehensive question, Ogden refers to the former as religion and the latter as a
"basic faith in the meaning of life."27 Ogden argues that this basic faith is pre-
supposed by all human activity. It involves "accepting the larger setting of one's
life and adjusting oneself to it."2 It implicitly answers the existential or compre-
hensive question because it involves a self-conscious adjustment to these condi-
tions.29 Unlike other animals, human animals not only "live by faith" but "seek
understanding.""0 Humans are "instinct poor"; "[n]ot only the details of our lives
but even their overall pattern as authentically human remain undecided by our
membership in the human species and are left to our own freedom and responsi-
bility to decide."" l In other words, humans do not live by merely accepting their
setting and adjusting to it (basic faith); they seek a reflective self-understanding
of reality (the whole) and their place in it (authentic human existence). Religion
provides the concepts and symbols for human reflective self-understanding; it
attempts to make sense "of our basic faith in the meaning of life, given the facts
of life as we actually experience it."'32 To the extent that humans act with reflec-
tive self-understanding or have an explicit comprehensive understanding of
authentic human existence, they are religious. Consequently, for the purposes of
this discussion, "religion" will be equated with an explicit "comprehensive claim
or conviction about human authenticity." This means that religion not only
includes the recognized world religions of Christianity, Judaism, Islam,
25. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 20, at 7.
26. GAMWELL, supra note 22, at 23 n.5.
27. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 20, at 18.
28. SHUBERT M. OGDEN, ON THEOLOGY 70 (1986).
29. For clarity, it should be noted that Ogden argues that both basic faith and religion involve understanding
and faith. However, basic faith is not reflective while religion is reflective. In terms slightly different to those
used here, he distinguishes between "the existential understanding or faith [basic faith] that is constitutive of
human existence as such and the reflective understanding or faith [religion] whereby what is presented existen-
tially can be re-presented in an express, thematic, and conceptually precise way." Id. at 7 1.
30. Id. at 106.
31. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 20, at 6.
32. Id. at 18.
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Hinduism, and Buddhism, but it also includes humanism, capitalism (when pro-
posed as a normative rather than as a positive theory),3 communism, and other
so-called secular answers to the existential question. This also means that there
is and always has been a plurality of religions or comprehensive self-understand-
ings. As a result, all human activity (including legal interpretation) is either
explicitly informed by a plurality of religious convictions or implicitly informed
by a basic faith in the meaningfulness of existence.
Schubert Ogden also maintains that reason plays an essential role in the artic-
ulation and evaluation of religious convictions.3 4 He rejects two common
assumptions about theology that preclude critical reflection on religious convic-
tions: "(1) that theology as such has to appeal to special criteria of truth for some
if not all of its assertions; and (2) that the theologian as such has to be a believer
already committed to the truth of the assertions that theological reflection seeks
to establish." 5 To the contrary, he argues that religious convictions are subject to
critical validation. Religious convictions are different in the sense that they are
comprehensive but that does not mean they are beyond critical or rational valida-
tion. In fact, he maintains that "it is the very nature of a religion to make or
imply the claim to formal religious truth."5 In other words, religious convictions,
33. See David R. Loy, The Religion of the Market, 65 J. AM. AcAD. RELIGION 275 (1997). After adopting a
functionalist view of religion "as what grounds us by teaching us what the world is, and what our role in the
world is," Loy argues that "our present economic system should also be understood as our religion, because it
has come to fulfill a religious function for us. The discipline of economics is less a science than the theology
of that religion, and its god, the Market, has become a vicious circle of ever-increasing production and con-
sumption by pretending to offer a secular salvation. The collapse of communism-best understood as a capi-
talist 'heresy'-makes it more apparent that the Market is becoming the first truly world religion, binding all
comers of the globe more and more tightly into a worldview and set of values whose religious role we overlook
only because we insist on seeing them as 'secular."' Id.
34. Despite the common assumption that religion is nonrational, many theologians and philosophers have
argued that religious convictions depend, at least in part, on rational reflection for their articulation and evalua-
tion. This does not mean that they have agreed upon the definition of reason, its role in critical reflection, or its
priority with respect to revelation. Differences about these issues should not take away from the important role
reason has played in formulating and critiquing religious convictions. For example, reason has been central to
systematic theology and philosophical theology even though there has not been agreement on how the role of
reason should be defined. At one extreme, Immanuel Kant argues that philosophical theology depends on pure
reason to understand the possibility and the attributes of the concept of God. IMMANUEL KANT, LECTURES ON
PHLOsOPHicAL THEOLOGY (Allen W. Wood & Gertrude M. Clark trans., 1978). At the other extreme, Paul
Tillich claims that reason alone cannot give answers to the ultimate questions about life because in the existen-
tial situation, reason contradicts itself. PAUL TILLICH, 1 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 18-28 (1951). Philosophy helps
analyze the existential situation in which we live, but "[r]evelation is the answer to the questions implied in the
existential conflicts of reason." Id. at 147. Somewhere in between, David Tracy maintains that "contemporary
Christian theology is best understood as philosophical reflection upon the meanings present in common human
experience and the meanings present in the Christian tradition." DAVID TRnc, BLESSED RAGE FOR ORDER: THE
NEW PLURALISM iN THEOLOGY 34 (1975). Although these approaches incorporate philosophy (reason) into the-
ology in different ways, they all support the necessary role of reason for theological reflection about religious
convictions. Religious convictions are not exempt from critical reflection; they are the product of critical
reflection. This is not to say that other theologians have not deemphasized or minimized the role of reason in
theological reflection. See, e.g., JOHN CALVIN, INSTITUTES OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION Bk. I, ch. i, sec. 1, 35-37
(Vol. XX, The Library of Christian Classics) (John T. McNeill ed., Ford Lewis Battles trans., 1960). (arguing
that religious arguments based on revelation are more reliable because human reason is corrupted by sin (self-
deception)). Rather, it is to emphasize that there are numerous theologians and philosophers who have
embraced reason as a central part of the theological task of articulating and evaluating religious convictions.
These positions thus further support the assumption that religious convictions are rational and subject to critical
reflection.
35. OGDEN, ON THEOLOGY, supra note 28, at 103.
36. OGDEN, Is THERE ONLY ONE, supra note 20, at 13.
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like any cognitive claim, suggest that they can be validated in a non-question
begging way. Assuming that Ogden's arguments about how religious convic-
tions can and should be critically validated succeed," this means that judges and
other officials should validate their religious convictions before relying on them
for fully justifying their interpretation of international law.
B. Moderate Legal Indeterminancy
My essential descriptive assumption about the nature of law in general is
that the law is indeterminate such that there are hard cases where the apparently
relevant statutes, treaties, common law, international customs, contracts, or con-
stitutional law provisions at issue do not clearly resolve the dispute. Many theo-
rists now refer to this broadly as legal indeterminacy." There appears to be an
overwhelming consensus that the law is indeterminate but little consensus about
what that means. 9 For example, extreme-radical deconstructionists such as
Anthony D'Amato have argued that even the U.S. Constitutional requirement
that the President be thirty-five years of age is not an easy case (i.e., indetermi-
nate).40 However, even contemporary legal formalists, such as Ernest Weinrib,
claim that "[n]othing about formalism precludes indeterminacy."41 He argues
that "formalism does not rely on the antecedent determinacy for particular cases
of the concepts entrenched in positive law" but that "the organ of positive law
37. See MODAK-TRURAN, REENCHANTING THE LAW, supra note 19, at 276-93. Obviously, the nature of rea-
son and rationality are highly contested matters. I will not attempt to redeem Ogden's understanding of these
concepts here. Elsewhere, I have tried to show that assuming religion is irrational results in incoherent
accounts of judicial decision making. See id. at 42-178. Jiirgen Habermas's, John Rawls's, and Kent
Greenawalt's models of judicial decision making all ironically presuppose a nonrational comprehensive con-
viction. Similarly, Perry's persuasive secular argument requirement depends upon his Roman Catholic reli-
gious convictions. All of these theories of judicial decision making are incoherent because they presuppose
comprehensive convictions but at the same time deny the possibility of rational comprehensive reflection.
Under these models of judicial decision making, the rational autonomy of judicial decision making incoherent-
ly depends on a nonrational comprehensive conviction. Cf FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, DEMOCRACY ON PURPOSE:
JUSTICE AND THE REALITY OF GOD (2000). In Democracy on Purpose, Gamwell seeks to demonstrate that the
presumed sparation of politics and theism puts democracy on an intellectually insecure foundation. He argues
that the separation of justice from a comprehensive telos by Jtirgen Habermas, Alan Gewirth, Brian Barry, and
John Rawls results in an incoherent account of democracy because their nonteleological theories of justice
include a conception of the comprehensive good. By contrast, he seeks to articulate "a theistic conception of
what makes life distinctively human" and to demonstrate how this provides a coherent account of human free-
dom that supports our democratic commitment. Id. at ix. See also Mark C. Modak-Truran, Book Review, 26 J.
LAW & RELIGION 823 (2001) (reviewing FRANKLIN I. GAMWELL, DEOMOCRACY ON PURPOSE: JUSTICE AND THE
REALITY OF GOD (2000)).
38. See, e.g., Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy and Legitimacy, in LEGAL HERMENEUTICS: HISTORY, THEORY,
AND PRACTICE 200-15 (Gregory Leyh ed., 1992).
39. Ken Kress notes that "versions of indeterminacy differ according to whether they claim that the court
has complete discretion to achieve any outcome at all (execute the plaintiff who brings suit to quiet title to his
cabin and surrounding property in the Rocky Mountains) or rather has a limited choice among a few options
(hold for defendant or plaintiff within a limited range of monetary damages or other remedies), or some posi-
tion in between." Id. at 201.
40. Anthony D'Amato, Aspects of Deconstruction: The "Easy Case " of the Under-Aged President, 84 Nw.
U. L. REv. 250 (1989). D'Amato notes that "[d]econstructionists say that all interpretation depends on context.
Radical deconstructionists add that, because contexts can change, there can be no such thing as a single inter-
pretation of any text that is absolute and unchanging for all time." Id. at 252. See also Anthony D'Amato,
Aspects of Deconstruction: The Failure of the Word "Bird", 84 Nw. U. L. REV. 536 (1990); Anthony
D'Amato, Pragmatic Indeterminacy, 85 Nw. U. L. REv. 148 (1990).
41. Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 1008
(1988).
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has the function of determining an antecedently indeterminate controversy. ''42
Consequently, in its weaker forms, the indeterminacy thesis merely signals the
almost universal rejection of strong legal formalism.
Both the Legal Realists and Critical Legal Studies Movement ("CLS") have
forcefully undermined the feasibility of strong legal formalism. In fact, the ori-
gin of the consensus about the indeterminacy of the law can be traced back to
the Legal Realists' critique of Langdell and other strong legal formalists." For
example, Karl Llewellyn rejects deductive legal certainty and argues that "legal
rules do not lay down any limits within which a judge moves."" Rather,
a legal rule functions not as a closed space within which one
remains, but rather as a bough whose branches are growing; in
short, as a guideline and not as a starting premise; not as inflexi-
ble iron armor which constrains or even forbids growth, but as a
skeleton which supports and conditions growth, and even pro-
motes and in some particulars liberates it.4"
For legal realists, this understanding of legal rules entails a rule scepticism that
recognizes the indeterminacy of law. CLS is also well known for its claim about
the radical indeterminacy of the law. However, it rejects not only strong legal
formalism but also any attempt to find a rational principle that can resolve legal
indeterminacy. For instance, Mark Kelman argues that there is a CLS version of
legal indeterminacy which
is quite distinct from the Realist one. This stronger CLS claim
is that the legal system is invariably simultaneously philosophi-
cally committed to mirror-image contradictory norms, each of
which dictates the opposite result in any case (no matter how
42. Id.
43. Christopher Columbus Langdell is often considered the archetype of strong legal formalism. He consid-
ered law a science and claimed that "all the available materials of that science are contained in printed books."
A. SUTIERL,AND, TiE LAW AT HARVARD 175 (1967). For further discussion of the dominance of strong legal
formalism from the Civil War to World War I, see GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 41-67
(1977). Langdell argued that common law cases could be reduced to a formal system and that the judge, like a
technician, could determine the right decision as a matter of deductive logic by pigeonholing cases into the for-
mal system. In other words, strong legal formalism maintains that legal decision making is essentially a deduc-
tive process whereby the application of legal rules results in determinative outcomes from the constraints
imposed by the language of the law. Cf MICHEL ROSENFELD, JUST INTERPRETATIONS: LAW BETWEEN ETHICS
AND POLITICS 33 (1998). See also David A. Strauss, The Role of a Bill of Rights, 59 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 539
(1992). In discussing the conception of the Bill of Rights as a Code, Strauss defines formalism as including
"three things: a heavy reliance on the precise language of the text; a pretense that the text resolves more issues
than it actually does; and an effort to shift responsibility for a decision away from the actual decisiomaker and
to some other party, such as the Framers." Id. at 544.
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"easy" the case first appears). While settled practice is not
unattainable, the CLS claim is that settled justificatory schemes
are in fact unattainable."
In The Concept of Law, the prominent legal positivist H. L. A. Hart further
provides a helpful account of legal indeterminacy with his idea of the "open tex-
ture of the law." Hart advocates a middle path between formalism and rule
skepticism such that the indeterminacy of the law allows for "varied types of
reasoning which courts characteristically use in exercising the creative function
left to them by the open texture of law in statute or precedent."4 7 Hart helps
make clear that this open texture or indeterminacy concerns not only "particular
legal rules" but also "the ultimate criteria of validity" which he refers to as "the
rule of recognition."4 With respect to the rule of recognition, this results in a
paradoxical situation where courts are determining the ultimate criteria of legal
validity in the process of deciding whether a particular law is valid. 9 Hart
claims that "the law in such cases is fundamentally incomplete: it provides no
answer to the questions at issue in such cases" and that courts must exercise the
restricted law-making function which he refers to as discretion." Consequently,
in hard cases, the judge "is entitled to follow standards or reasons for decision
which are not dictated by the law and may differ from those followed by other
judges faced with similar hard cases."51
For the purposes of this article, the larger question raised by the indetermi-
nacy thesis is whether legal interpretation can be rationally justified or legitimat-
ed under the conditions of legal indeterminacy. Ken Kress has noted that "[t]he
indeterminacy thesis asserts that law does not constrain judges sufficiently, rais-
ing the specter that judicial decision making is often or always illegitimate." 2 Is
judicial decision making merely the arbitrary exercise of political power? 3 Or is
46. MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 13 (1987). David Kairys similarly argues that
[t]he lack of required, legally correct rules, methodologies, or results is in part a finction of
the limits of language and interpretation, which are subjective and value laden. More
importantly, indeterminacy stems from the reality that the law usually embraces and legit-
imizes many or all of the conflicting values and interests involved in controversial issues
and a wide and conflicting array of "logical" or "reasoned" arguments and strategies of
argumentation, without providing any legally required hierarchy of values or arguments or
any required method for determining which is most important in a particular context.
Judges then make choices, and those choices are most fundamentally value based, or politi-
cal.
David Kairys, Introduction, in THE POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 4 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998).
47. HART, supra note 4, at 144.
48. Hart notes that the rule of recognition can be partly, but never completely, indeterminate. For example, in
the United States, the United States Constitution could be indeterminate in some sense, but the rule of recognition
conferring authority (jurisdiction) on the court to exercise its creative powers to settle the ultimate criteria of
validity raises no doubts even though the precise scope of that power may raise some doubts. See id. at 148-49.
49. Id. at 148.
50. Id. at 252.
51. Id. at 273.
52. Kress, supra note 38, at 203.
53. For example, CLS rejects the claims that law and morality can be based on an apolitical method or proce-
dure of justification and that the legal system can be objectively defended as embodying an intelligible moral
order. See, e.g., Roberto M. Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARv. L. REV. 563 (1983). The
legal order is merely the outcome of power struggles or practical compromises. Thus, they advocate "the purely
instrumental use of legal practice and legal doctrine to advance leftist aims." Id. at 567.
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it just the product of the particular life experience of the judge? 4 Consequently,
the indeterminacy thesis puts into question the notion of the "Rule of Law."
Lawrence Solum claims that
if the indeterminacy thesis is true, then legal justice will fall
short of the ideal of the rule of law in at least three ways: (1)
judges will rule by arbitrary decision, because radically indeter-
minate law cannot constrain judicial decision; (2) the laws will
not be public, in the sense that the indeterminate law that is pub-
licized could not be the real basis for judicial decision; and (3)
there will be no basis for concluding that like cases are treated
alike, because the very ideal of legal regularity is empty if law is
radically indeterminate. 5
In a democratic society, this arguably means that judges are subverting
democratic rule by creating the law outside of the legislative process and that
judicial decision making is illegitimate. In the public international law context,
this further means that judges may override democratically created municipal
laws based on their interpretation of indeterminate international legal norms.
The relevant international legal norms would not provide a sufficient basis for
judges' decisions. Judges have to rely on extra-legal norms to determine what
international law requires. This raises the question of what provides a justifica-
tion or legitimation for these extra-legal norms. Consequently, unless a norma-
tive theory of law can justify those extra-legal norms, legal indeterminancy cre-
ates a "legitimation crisis" for international law.
C. The Nature of International Law5
In addition to my descriptive assumption about legal indeterminacy, the fol-
lowing sets forth my descriptive assumptions about the nature of international
54. Jerome Frank is well known for his claim that judicial decisions can, in principle, be explained by a psy-
choanalysis of a judge's life experiences. He comments that "[w]hat we may hope some day to get from our
judges are detailed autobiographies containing the sort of material that is recounted in the autobiographical
novel; or opinions annotated, by the judge who writes them, with elaborate explorations of the background fac-
tors in his personal experience which swayed him in reaching his conclusions. For in the last push, a judge's
decisions are the outcome of his entire life-history." JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 123-24
(1930).
55. Lawrence B. Solum, Indeterminacy, in A COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY OF LAW AND LEGAL THEORY 488,
489 (Dennis Patterson ed., 1996).
56. Sometimes international law is divided into public and private international law. Public international
law primarily concerns the interaction of states and focuses on questions arising from the application of interna-
tional legal norms such as treaties. By contrast, "[p]rivate international law or international business transac-
tions concerns domestic and international regulation of foreign investment and the movement of goods and
workers across national borders." Joel R. Paul, The Isolation of Private International Law, 7 Wis. INT'L L.J.
149, 151 n.4 (1988). Private international law deals primarily with the transnational application of municipal or
domestic law and requires determining which municipal law applies (i.e., involves a question of conflicts of
law or choice of law). See Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridical Touchdown: The Regulatory
Function of Private International Law in an Era of Globalization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 209, 241
(2002) (arguing that "private international law has remained primarily the domain of national laws and national
institutions, rather than international treaties and international courts"). To the extent I am focusing primarily
on the conflict between international and municipal legal norms, my focus could be classified as primarily deal-
ing with public international law. However, legal indeterminacy raises the same problem in the private interna-
tional law context. What do judges rely on when the municipal law is indeterminate? How can those extra-
legal norms be justified? Consequently, I will usually refer to international law more generally rather than to
nublic international law.
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law. International law has traditionally been conceived as the law governing the
relations between sovereign states. The core principles include "[t]erritorial sov-
ereignty, equality of states, non-intervention in domestic affairs and state consent
as the basis of international legal obligation.""7 Some refer to this as the
Westphalian model of international law because they date its origin from the
treaties signed to achieve the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.58 Under this model,
domestic affairs, including human rights, are governed by municipal law.
Independent states may hold each other to the terms of their treaties, but they do
not have the right to meddle in one another's internal affairs.
Many theorists have argued, however, that since World War II, a new model
of international law has emerged. 9 This model provides that international law
can take precedence over municipal law with respect to transnational and domes-
tic matters. Sovereignty over domestic affairs is no longer absolute. For exam-
ple, in 1945, the Nuremberg Charter established that individuals could be pun-
ished for "Crimes Against Peace," "War Crimes," and "Crimes Against
Humanity" even if the individuals committing those crimes were acting in accor-
dance with municipal law or orders of a superior.6" In 1950, the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms1
further established a radical innovation in international law by allowing citizens
to initiate claims against their own governments for failing to protect the human
rights recognized by the European Convention.2 This innovation meant that
individuals, rather than states, had standing to bring charges for violations of
human rights. More recently, the United Nations established the International
Criminal Court in 1998 to provide a permanent institution for prosecuting "the
most serious crimes of concern to the international community" including "The
crime of genocide," "Crimes against humanity," "War crimes," and "The crime
of aggression."6 "
This change in international law implies that international law is "universal"
in some sense. For example, the United Nations Universal Declaration of
Human Rights advocates broad protection for the "right to life, liberty and secu-
rity of person," the "right to marry and to found a family," the "right to own
property," "freedom of thought, conscience and religion," "freedom of opinion
and expression," and "freedom of peaceful assembly and association."'  The
Preamble of the Universal Declaration further emphasizes that "a common
57. James Crawford & Susan Marks, The Global Democracy Deficit: An Essay in International Law and Its
Limits, in RE-IMAGING POLITICAL COMMUNITY: STUDIES IN COSMOPOLITAN DEMOCRACY 72 (Daniele Archibugi
et al. eds., 1998).
58. HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 37. See also Stephen D. Krasner,
Compromising Westphalia, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER, supra note 8, at 124-35.
59. KRASNER, supra note 58, at 124-35.
60. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis
Powers and Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, Arts. 6, 8, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S.
279.
61. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950,
art. 25, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (providing that the European Commission can receive petitions "from any person,
non-govemmental organization or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the
High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in this Convention") [hereinafter European Connection].
62. See HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 1, at 68.
63. United Nations: Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, art. 5, 37 I.L.M. 999,
1003-04.
64. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Dec. 10, 1948, Arts. 3, 16-20, U.N. Doc. A/810, at 71.
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understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance" and
"[p]roclaims this Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a common standard
of achievement for all peoples and all nations."65 The "Universal Declaration"
thus suggests that the human rights recognized in its text are "universal," at least
in the sense that they are superior to any contrary rights protected by municipal
law.
To the extent that international legal norms are derived from one of the rec-
ognized sources of positive international law, I will assume that they are legiti-
mate and binding on the adjudication of international law disputes. I will further
assume that these recognized international legal norms are "universal" because
they are recognized by positive international law. For example, Article 38 of the
Statute of the International Court of Justice provides that the International Court
of Justice should apply the following sources of international law: "international
conventions," "international custom," "general principles of law recognized in
civilized nations," and "judicial decisions and the teachings of the most highly
qualified publicists of the various nations."66 These sources indicate that positive
international law can be considered "universal" in the sense that it is the subject
of an international consensus either by international conventions, by internation-
al customs, by corresponding municipal principles of law, by corresponding judi-
cial decisions, or by legal experts. This really amounts to validating internation-
al law as a higher level convention that takes precedence over the lower level
convention supporting municipal law. For the purposes of this article, this posi-
tivistic account of universal law will not be challenged. Given the legitimacy of
these international legal norms, there will be easy cases where these legal norms
will resolve disputes independently of religious or comprehensive convictions.
In easy cases, judges can interpret and apply international law without relying on
extra-legal norms including comprehensive or religious convictions.
Consequently, I will not be challenging the autonomy of international law in this
sense.
However, these recognized international legal norms are frequently inade-
quate to resolve disputes. International legal norms often conflict with one
another or are ambiguous so that international law is indeterminate. For exam-
ple, the case of Amina Lawal, who faced stoning for "adultery" in Nigeria until
her sentence was overturned on appeal, clearly demonstrates the indeterminancy
of international law.67 Mrs. Lawal was convicted under Islamic Shari'a law of
adultery for having a child out of wedlock and sentenced to death by stoning. 6
This death sentence is both supported by and contradicted by international legal
norms. Nigeria is a signatory to the International Convenant on Civil and
65. Id. at Preamble (emphasis added).
66. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Oct. 24, 1945, art. 38, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993 [here-
inafter Stat. of ICJ].
67. Nigeria Court Overturns Stoning Sentence, CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Oct. 18, 2003, at 18 (reporting that
March 2002 sentence of death by stoning for adultery overturned by a 4-1 vote by a five-judge Islamic court of
appeals on September 23, 2004). See also Madhavi Sunder, Beauty Marred: The "Miss World" Riots, a
Stoning Sentence, and the Conflict Between Religious and Secular Law in Nigeria, FindLaw's Legal
Commentary 3 (last visited Dec. 5, 2002) http://writ.news.findlaw.com/commentary/ 20021205/sunder.html.
68. Nelly Van Doom-Harder, On Not Throwing Stones: Christian and Muslim Conflict in Nigeria,
CHRISTIAN CENTURY, Feb. 8, 2003, at 8.
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Political Rights which protects the "freedom of religion," the "right of self-deter-
mination," the "inherent right to life" and prohibits "cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment."69 On the one hand, the practice of stoning would
appear to violate both the prohibition against "cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment," and the "inherent right to life" which includes limiting the
"sentence of death" to only "the most serious crimes."70 On the other hand, the
application of Islamic Shari'a law seems supported by the "freedom of religion"
and the "right of self-determination."71 With respect to the right to self-determi-
nation, twelve of the northern states of Nigeria adopted expanded versions of
Shari'a Islamic law by the end of 2000.72 This expanded the jurisdiction of
Islamic Shari'a courts from primarily family or personal cases to include crimi-
nal cases.7" Assuming that these twelve northern states made this decision
through democratic processes, this political decision is arguably justified by the
right to self-determination protected by the International Covenant. Moreover,
this conflict among rights protected by the International Covenant cannot be
resolved from the provisions of the Covenant itself. No priority among these
rights is specified in the text of the treaty.
Even if this conflict did not exist, the scope of the individual rights is
ambiguous or indeterminate. For instance, Article 18 of the International
Covenant provides that the "[f]reedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may
be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to
protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and free-
doms of others."74 Is stoning someone to death for adultery necessary to protect
public morals? With respect to the Lawal case, a Muslim speaker commented
"that just thinking about the ravages caused by the AIDS epidemic was enough
to justify stoning as a way of discouraging sexual license."" Is that right? Or
does stoning someone to death based on a religious law interfere with the funda-
mental right to life of the person sentenced under that law? Consequently,
despite the recognized sources of international law, there are many hard cases,
such as the Lawal case, where the relevant international legal norms are indeter-
minate both because they conflict and because they are ambiguous.
Given these hard cases, the fundamental question becomes: what legitimates
the application of international legal norms if they are indeterminate? There is
no "universal" consensus to rely on in the interpretation and application of inter-
national legal norms because the sources of international consensus (the sources
of international law) are indeterminate. Despite this indeterminacy, the interna-
tional legal norms have prima facie priority over municipal legal norms. This
priority suggests that the international legal norms are "universal," in some
sense, while the municipal legal norms are nonuniversal or conventional. In the
interpretative process, legal interpreters must determine whether or not their
69. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, arts. 1, 6, 7 & 18, 6 I.L.M. 368
(1967) [hereinafter International Covenant].
70. Id. at arts. 6 & 7.
71. Id. at arts. 1 & 18.
72. Sunder, supra note 67, at 2.
73. Id.
74. International Covenant, supra note 69, at arts. 18.
75. Van Doom-Harder, supra note 68, at 9.
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understanding of those norms support this priority. To make this determination,
legal interpreters must rely on extra-legal norms because the relevant law is inde-
terminate. Furthermore, since international legal norms are prima facie univer-
sal, legal interpreters must determine for themselves what "universal" extra-legal
norms justify the application of the international legal norms.
The international context also highlights the issue of hard cases more dra-
matically than the domestic context. For example, judges often posit societal
consensus in domestic cases as a sufficient "justification" for their decisions
even though relying on this consensus as normative must still be justified. In the
international context, however, it is harder to posit some "international" consen-
sus about extra-legal norms as universal. The positive sources of international
law completely, or nearly completely, identify the possible sources of interna-
tional consensus. Since these possible sources of international consensus are
indeterminate, interpreters of international law are forced to rely on their own
"universal" extra-legal normative beliefs. To the extent that their decision mak-
ing is fully justified, these "universal" normative beliefs must be derived from
their religious or comprehensive convictions. Religious or comprehensive con-
victions are the most comprehensive or universal beliefs that humans hold. They
define what the interpreter takes to be authentic human existence as such, which
is a universal normative claim. In other words, religious convictions purport "to
identify the necessary and sufficient moral condition or comprehensive condition
of all valid moral claims."76 The argument below thus attempts to demonstrate
how fully justifying any extra-legal norm and the choice among them in hard
cases requires relying on religious convictions about authentic human existence.
Furthermore, the magnitude of the problems raised by legal indeterminancy
in international law appears to be greater than in the domestic context. Although
they are increasing, there are relatively few international and regional tribunals
that could produce authoritative interpretations of international law to decrease
the indeterminancy of international legal norms. Even if there were more of
these tribunals, some of the empirical work that has been done on "the problem
of legal (un)certainty in the global arena" suggests that most domestic courts "do
not take notice of court opinions in other countries" and "refuse to apply the lex
mercatoria and even refuse to enforce arbitration awards based on these
autonomous rules."' In addition, international treaty making cannot feasibly act
as an international form of legislation to respond to legal indeterminacy by
amending and modifying existing international legal norms. Therefore, there is
no legislative process that can be relied on to decrease legal indeterminacy by
refining and filling in gaps in international law.
76. GAMWELL, supra note 22, at 71.
77. See, e.g., Volkmar Gessner, Globalization and Legal Certainty, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS
READER, supra note 8 at 172, 173. Gessner concludes that "[i]n spite of interesting global developments in
favour of securing economic exchanges, legal certainty is accomplished successfully and in a stable way nei-
ther by state legal devices nor by lex mercatoria, nor by norms and behavioural patterns created autonomously
within third cultures. Some specific roles [international arbitrators, diamond dealers, and international
bankers] create legal certainty for some specific groups, but most global actors ... gain no access to these
groups and cannot make use of qualified support structures." Id. at 178-79.
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Recognizing the heightened problem of legal indeterminancy in international
law, however, does not undermine the legality of international law. First, identi-
fying the indeterminacy of international law is not to accept the conclusion of
some political realists that "international law is little more than a sham."" s
Rather, it means that a normative theory of law must be developed to justify the
application of international law when it is indeterminate. Second, domestic law
raises similar problems which also require reenchanting the law for fully justify-
ing judicial decisions in hard cases.79 Finally, even if international law is consid-
ered to be aspirational (i.e., a set of moral rather than "legal norms"),"0 the same
problems of full justification arise. In both cases, interpreting and applying inde-
terminate norms requires a normative theory that can provide for the justification
of practical legal or moral decisions when the relevant norms are indeterminate.
My argument is that religious or comprehensive convictions are required for
fully justifying indeterminate legal or moral norms. The following, however,
will assume that international law is "law" in some sense and argue that judges
must rely on religious or comprehensive convictions for fully justifying the
application of international law in hard cases.
II. RESPONDING TO LEGAL INDETERMINANCY
Why are religious convictions needed? Don't other legal theories provide an
adequate normative theory for justifying international law in hard cases without
relying on religious convictions? Although a comprehensive response to this
question is not possible here, two groups of theories will be considered briefly.
A. Legal Positivism and Critical Legal Studies
In general, legal theories embracing legal indeterminacy tend to recognize
legal indeterminancy but do not try to provide a normative theory to justify legal
interpretation in hard cases. For example, Hart's legal positivism noted above
recognizes legal indeterminacy or the open texture of the law. Hart does not
explain what justifies judges' decisions in hard cases but merely says that deci-
78. Terry Nardin, Realism, Cosmopolitanism and the Rule of Law, 81 PROCEEDINGS OF THE AMERICAN
SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 415 (1987) (reprinted in INTERNATIONAL LAW ANTHOLOGY 351 (Anthony
D'Amato ed., 1994)). Nardin further states that political realism
postulates the inevitable division of mankind into separate states and proposes a strategy
for national survival in the international order created by this division. Its principal the-
sis is that international relations take place in a state of nature. Lacking collective
enforcement, international law is little more than a sham. Since no state can be sure that
other states will observe the law, each state must rely on self-help to protect its interests
and security. Foreign policy must be guided by prudence, not morality or law.
Id.
79. See MODAK-TRURAN, REENCHANTING THE LAW, supra note 19, at 179-296 (arguing that the indetermina-
cy of U.S. law requires judges to rely on religious or comprehensive convictions to justify their deliberation
about hard cases fully even though they can only provide a partial justification of their decisions in their writ-
ten opinions in terms of noncomprehensive legal norms because of the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment).
80. John Austin famously argued that "the law obtaining between nations is not positive law .... The
duties which it imposes are enforced by moral sanctions [i.e., not by force like law]: by fear on the part of
nations, or by fear on the part of sovereigns, of provoking general hostility, and incurring its probable evils, in
case they shall violate maxims generally received and respect." JANIS, supra note 6, at 3 (quoting JOHN
AusTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 208 (1st ed. 1832)).
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sions in these cases are a matter of judicial discretion rather than dictated by
law."1 In hard cases, the judge "is entitled to follow standards or reasons for
decision which are not dictated by the law and may differ from those followed
by other judges faced with similar hard cases." 2 No normative bases or restric-
tions are given. Judges can decide in whatever manner they please. The prob-
lem here is that if the amount of discretion is substantial, it is hard to hold on to
the idea of the "Rule of Law." Legal indeterminacy swallows up the rule of law.
The Critical Legal Studies Movement also embraces legal indeterminancy.
However, it takes legal indeterminacy a step further and concludes that legal
decision making is merely political rather than rational. Law and morality can-
not be based on an apolitical method or procedure of justification, and the legal
system cannot be objectively defended as embodying an intelligible moral
order." Like all law, international law does not provide a consistent set of norms
to resolve disputes. Judges merely impose their political sense of justice on the
parties, and the legal order is merely the outcome of power struggles or practical
compromises.' Consequently, legal indeterminacy is not overcome but radical-
ized to undermine the possibility of all objective or universal claims. Thus, nei-
ther legal positivism nor critical legal studies attempt to provide an extra-legal
basis for justifying the application of international law when it is indeterminate.
B. John Rawls's Legal Liberalism
Contrary to these approaches, other legal theories cannot accept this
response to legal indeterminacy. For example, legal liberalism advocates a ratio-
nal basis for legal interpretation despite legal indeterminacy. To further support
my argument that religious convictions are required for fully justifying legal
interpretation in hard cases, I will briefly demonstrate that legal liberalism
requires the establishment of a comprehensive conviction and is finally incoher-
ent. John Rawls's theory in The Law of Peoples will be taken as a representative
form of legal liberalism and legal liberalism's failure to solve the legitimation
crisis of international law.
1. The Law of Peoples
In The Law of Peoples, Rawls attempts to specify a "Law of Peoples" which
provides "a particular political conception of right and justice that applies to the
principles and norms of international law and practice." 6 Following Kant's
lead,86 he attempts to extend "a liberal conception of justice," based on a social
81. HART, supra note 4, at 252. See text accompanying notes 28-3 1.
82. Id. at 273.
83. See, e.g., Unger, supra note 53; KELMAN, supra note 46.
84. See Unger, supra note 53, at 567 (advocating "the purely instrumental use of legal practice and legal
doctrine to advance leftist aims").
85. JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES WITH "THE IDEA OF PUBLIC REASON REvISITED" 3 (1999) [hereinafter
RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES].
86. Cf Immanuel Kant, Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Intent (1784), in PERPETUAL
PEACE AND OTHER ESSAYS 33, 38 (Ted Humphrey trans., 1983) (arguing that "[t]he greatest problem for the
human species, whose solution nature compels it to seek, is to achieve a universal civil society administered in
accord with the right" and makes a "philosophical attempt to work out a universal history of the world in
accord with a plan of nature that aims at a perfect civic union of the human").
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contract theory, from "a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples.""7 A "Society
of Peoples" means "all those peoples who follow the ideals and principles of the
Law of Peoples in their mutual relations."8 He argues for a Law of Peoples
rather than a Law of Nations because of the changes in international law since
World War II. Similar to the account in Section I, he argues that "international
law has become stricter" because "[i]t tends to limit a state's right to wage war to
instances of self-defense (also in the interests of collective security), and it also
tends to restrict a state's right to internal sovereignty."89 Rawls attempts to take
these new limits into account by shifting from a focus on the sovereignty of
states (the Law of Nations) to a focus on the rights of people (the Law of
Peoples).
To generate the Law of Peoples, Rawls relies on his earlier idea of the origi-
nal position and extends it to a second original position with some slight modifi-
cations.9 He argues that both liberal peoples (peoples representing liberal con-
stitutional democracies) and decent peoples (nonliberal peoples representing
societies whose "basic institutions meet certain specified conditions of political
right and justice")91 "will affirm the same Law of Peoples that would hold among
just liberal societies" so that this law can be considered "universal in its reach."92
Rawls argues that the "basic charter of the Law of Peoples" would include eight
principles:
1. Peoples are free and independent, and their freedom and
independence are to be respected by other peoples.
2. Peoples are to observe treaties and undertakings.
3. Peoples are equal and are parties to the agreements that bind
them.
4. Peoples are to observe a duty of non-intervention.
5. Peoples have the right of self-defense but no right to insti-
gate war for reasons other than self-defense.
6. Peoples are to honor human rights.
7. Peoples are to observe certain specified restrictions in the
conduct of war.
8. Peoples have a duty to assist other peoples living under
unfavorable conditions that prevent their having a just or
decent political and social regime.9 3
Furthermore, note that like his political conception of justice regarding social
cooperation between citizens in a constitutional democratic regime, the Law of
Peoples is "not expressed in terms of comprehensive doctrines of truth or of
87. RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 85, at 9.
88. Id. at 3.
89. Id. at 27.
90. Id. at 32-35, 39-42. For further discussion of the "'original position," see JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE 118-92 (1971) and RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 304-10.
91. RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 85, at 59. Rawls argues that "the Law of Peoples uses an
original position argument only three times: twice for liberal societies (once at the domestic level and once at
the Law of Peoples), but only once, at the second level, for decent hierarchical societies." Id. at 70.
92. Id. at 121.
93. Id. at 37.
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right, which may hold sway in this or that society, but in terms that can be shared
by different peoples."9 He assumes "that there is an even greater diversity in the
comprehensive doctrines affirmed among the members of the Society of Peoples
with its many different cultures and traditions.""5 The nonrational comprehen-
sive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines are not relevant to the content
of the Law of Peoples. As in Political Liberalism, Rawls proposes a political
conception of justice which is "political not metaphysical."96 Thus, the Law of
Peoples provides "a public political conception of justice" "which settles funda-
mental political questions as they arise for the Society of Peoples" without rely-
ing on comprehensive doctrines.9"
2. The Idea of Public Reason98
For the purposes of this article, however, the generation of these principles is
not the chief concern. The application of these principles under the conditions of
legal indeterminancy is what is important. Rawls does not say much about
applying the Law of Peoples. He argues that the Law of Peoples can be rational-
ly justified and applied based on public reason, which is independent of compre-
hensive religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines. "[T]he ideal of the public
reason of free and equal peoples is realized, or satisfied, whenever chief execu-
tives and legislators, and other government officials, as well as candidates for
public office, act from and follow the principles of the Law of Peoples and
explain to other peoples their reasons for pursing or revising a peoples' foreign
policy and affairs of state that involve other societies."99 Rawls maintains that
although public reason of liberal peoples and the public reason of the Society of
Peoples "do not have the same content, the role of public reason among free and
equal peoples is analogous to its role in a constitutional democratic regime
among free and equal citizens.""1 ' In the domestic context, the "content of public
reason" is formulated by a political conception of justice ("political values of
public reason") which includes two parts and two values: (1) "substantive princi-
ples of justice" for the basic structure of society ("the values of political jus-
tice"), and (2) "guidelines of inquiry" including "principles of reasoning and
rules of evidence in the light of which citizens are to decide whether substantive
principles properly apply and to identify laws and policies that best satisfy them"
("the values of public reason").1 1 In the international context, the first part of
public reason would be the substantive principles of the Law of Peoples speci-
fied above, and the second part would be the same as in the domestic context.
94. Id. at 55.
95. Id. at 40.
96. RAWLS, POLmcAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 10.
97. RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 85, at 123.
98. For a more complete summary and critique of Rawls's notion of public reason, see MODAK-TRURAN,
REENCHANTING THE LAW, supra note 19, at 89-135. See also Mark Modak-Truran, The Religious Dimension of
Judicial Decision Making and the De Facto Disestablishment, 81 MARQ. L. REv. 255, 266-71 (1998).
99. RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 85, at 56.
100. Id. at 55.
101. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 223-24.
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Except for this difference, public reason functions almost identically in both con-
texts. In both contexts, public reason requires that "fundamental political ques-
tions" "be based on a public political conception of justice,"10 2 but the content of
that conception of justice changes depending on the domestic or international
context. Consequently, to understand how public reason functions with respect
to the application of the Law of Peoples, I will rely on Rawls's more complete
analysis of public reason in its relation to constitutional democratic regimes.
With respect to public reason, Rawls holds out judicial decision making as
the ideal type. Rawls maintains that "public reason is the sole reason the court
exercises. It is the only branch of government that is visibly on its face the crea-
ture of that reason and of that reason alone."'10 3 Judges have "no other reason and
no other values than the political.""1 4 Judges must use public reason to justify all
their decisions and demonstrate how their decisions are consistent and fit with a
coherent constitutional interpretation of the law. Rawls holds out the United
States Supreme Court as the "exemplar of public reason" and emphasizes that
[t]he justices cannot, of course, invoke their own personal
morality, nor the ideals and virtues of morality generally. Those
they must view as irrelevant. Equally, they cannot invoke their
or other people's religious or philosophical views. Nor can they
cite political values without restriction. Rather, they must
appeal to the political values they think belong to the most rea-
sonable understanding of the public conception and its political
values ofjustice and public reason. These are values that they
believe in good faith, as the duty of civility requires, that all citi-
zens as reasonable and rational might reasonably be expected to
endorse.105
In other words, in both the deliberative process and the process of explana-
tion, judges should rely solely on the political values of public reason which are
independent of any particular comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral
doctrines.106 Even in cases where there appear to be legal arguments evenly bal-
anced on both sides, Rawls insists that judges cannot resolve cases based on their
personal views including their personal political views.0 7 In hard cases, judges
should seek the best interpretation of the law. The best interpretation is the one
that "best fits" the relevant treaties, customs, principles of municipal law, judi-
cial decisions, and the teachings of publicists, and the one that can be justified on
the basis of the political values of public reason. Rawls maintains that "the polit-
ical values of public reason provide the Court's basis for interpretation. 10 8 The
political values of public reason function like a higher law which provides
answers in hard cases and which informs judges' constructive interpretations of
prior precedent. When the relevant legal materials are indeterminate, Rawls
102. RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 85, at 123.
103. RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 235.
104. Id. at 235.
105. Id. at 236 (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 139.
107. Id. at lv.
108. Id. at 234.
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maintains that judges must rely on the political values of public reason alone.
Thus, this means the substantive principles of the Law of Peoples constitute a
higher law which judges should rely on exclusively to resolve hard international
law cases.
C. A Hidden Comprehensive Doctrine
Contrary to his aspirations for the Law of Peoples, Rawls legal liberalism
fails because it depends on a hidden comprehensive doctrine that religious judges
cannot accept and that leads to self-contradiction." 9 With respect to political lib-
eralism in general, several critics have argued against Rawls on the similar
grounds that religious adherents could not consistently accept his political liber-
alism. For example, Patrick Neal maintains that
citizen of faith cannot accept the strong reading of the idea that
her commitment to political liberalism must be wholehearted and
firm. This reading would insist that the principles of justice
characteristic of political liberalism should take priority over
provisions of one's comprehensive moral or religious view in
cases of conflict. The citizen of faith could not grant this much
authority to political liberalism without denying the ultimate
authority of God.1 '
A similar problem faces judges who hold comprehensive doctrines and are told
to adjudicate hard cases solely on the basis of public reason. Rawls's public rea-
son requires religious judges to order the political values of public reason in hard
cases on grounds they cannot accept as valid. When the relevant legal materials
are indeterminate, Rawls maintains that the court must rely on the political val-
ues of public reason to resolve a dispute about constitutional essentials or matters
of basic justice. Further, Rawls argues that in order for the political values alone
to "give a reasonable answer to all, or nearly all, questions involving constitu-
tional essentials and matters of basic justice," the ordering of values must be
made
in light of their structure and features within the political concep-
tion itself, and not primarily from how they occur within citi-
zens' comprehensive doctrines. Political values are not to be
ordered by viewing them separately and detached from one
another or from any definite context. They are not puppets
manipulated from behind the scenes by comprehensive doc-
trines.Il'
109. In addition to this criticism, Rawls's notion of public reason, even with the help of Ronald Dworkin's
interpretative legal theory, fails to solve the problem of legal indeterminancy. See MODAK-TRURAN,
REENCHANTING THE LAW, supra note 19, at 115-30.
110. Patrick Neal, Political Liberalism, Public Reason, and the Citizen of Faith, in NATURAL LAW AND
PUBLIC REASON 171, 183 (Robert P. George & Christopher Wolfe eds., 2000).
111. John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. CHI. L. REv. 765, 777 (1997).
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No religious judge, however, could accept this "political not metaphysical"
ordering of political values in hard cases. A comprehensive or religious convic-
tion "purports to identify the necessary and sufficient moral condition or com-
prehensive condition of all valid moral claims."'1 12 Thus, for the religious judge,
an ordering of political values is valid only if it coincides with the ordering dic-
tated by her comprehensive or religious convictions. Yet, Rawls's political lib-
eralism maintains that the political values of public reason must be ordered
exclusively by a "political not metaphysical" conception of justice (freestanding)
even in hard cases. In other words, this requires that every religious adherent
reject the claim that his or her comprehensive conviction is valid or reject that it
is the "comprehensive condition of all valid moral claims." Only those judges
who deny all comprehensive convictions (i.e., believe that political values are
independent of any particular answer to the comprehensive question) could
accept Rawls's "political not metaphysical" ordering of political values in hard
cases." 3 As a result, it is not clear how the Law of Peoples could be the subject
of an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines that Rawls
claims is required for a stable society." 4 Either the acceptance of the exclusive
political ordering of the political values is a mere modus vivendi'1 5 and inherently
unstable, or no consensus is possible and there are a plurality of orderings of the
political values informing the law as proposed by the reenchantment of interna-
tional law.
Moreover, Rawls's position may finally be incoherent. Recall that he claims
that an objective legitimation of law must be independent of comprehensive doc-
trines (i.e., based on the political values of public reason) because comprehen-
sive doctrines are nonpublic (i.e., not rational). This claim entails a comprehen-
sive denial of all comprehensive doctrines (moral relativism), which according to
Rawls is not possible, and thus results in an incoherent account of judicial deci-
sion making. In this respect, Franklin Gamwell argues that "[b]ecause a denial
of all religious or comprehensive convictions is itself a (negative) comprehensive
112. GAMWELL, supra note 22, at 70-71.
113. Franklin Gamwell argues that "[a]t best, in other words, the consensus that Rawls's political liberalism
requires is joined only by those who deny all comprehensive convictions, citizens who believe that principles
of justice are independent of any particular answer to the comprehensive question because no comprehensive
conviction is valid." Id. at 73. See also Abner S. Greene, Uncommon Ground-A Review of Political
Liberalism and Life's Dominion, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 646, 670 (1994) (book review) ("the effect of
Rawls's theory is to favor certain comprehensive doctrines over others without compensation").
114. Both in Political Liberalism and in The Law of Peoples, Rawls makes it clear that he thinks the political
conceptions of justice must be supported by an overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines.
RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15, at 147-48; RAWLs, THE LAW OF PEOPLES, supra note 85, at 16,
31-32. In other words, after the principles of justice are generated by the original position, they must then be
affirmed from within the comprehensive doctrines he refers to as reasonable. With respect to the Law of
Peoples, however, Rawls is not clear as to whether this political conception of justice must be the subject of an
overlapping consensus of reasonable comprehensive doctrines. Rawls comments that "[t]he unity of a reason-
able Society of Peoples does not require religious unity. The Law of Peoples provides a content of public rea-
son for the Society of Peoples parallel to the principles of justice in a democratic society." RAWLS, THE LAW OF
PEOPLES, supra note 85, at 18. Consequently, the Law of Peoples would not produce a stable Society of
Peoples if it was not the subject of an overlapping consensus by peoples holding reasonable comprehensive
doctrines.
115. Cf Neal, supra note 110, at 198 ("citizens of faith will at best be able to establish something of a modus
vivendi agreement with comprehensive liberals to abide by the Rawlsian account of political liberalism").
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claim, it prevents the validation or justification of any positive beliefs about
human authenticity, comprehensive or otherwise." '116 Rawls's claim then that the
political values of public reason must be independent of comprehensive doc-
trines implies a comprehensive denial of comprehensive doctrines and is self-
refuting. Therefore, Rawls's legal liberalism is incoherent. Its basis for pro-
hibiting judicial reliance on comprehensive doctrines in hard cases is itself based
on a comprehensive doctrine.
In addition, the failure of Rawls's theory to generate an overlapping consen-
sus means that Rawls's comprehensive denial of comprehensive doctrines must
be established as the official comprehensive doctrine. This is required to ensure
that in hard cases the political values of public reason are ordered exclusively by
a "political not metaphysical" conception of justice (freestanding). Establishing
this comprehensive doctrine, however, would mean that it would become the
official religion of international law. This would obviously face severe
resistence by those with other religious convictions and make the adoption of
such a comprehensive doctrine practically infeasible. Also, as argued below, the
normative requirements of pluralistic inclusivism proscribe the establishment of
a religion by the international community. Hence, Rawls's legal liberalism
should be rejected because it is incoherent and because it would require estab-
lishing an official comprehensive conviction in the international law.
III. FULL JUSTIFICATION, PLURALISITIC INCLUSIVISM AND JUSTIFYING LEGAL
INDETERMINANCY
Given the failure of legal liberalism and the indeterminancy of international
law, how are extra-legal norms given a "universal" justification to support a
rational interpretation of international law? In answering this question, I will
assume that interpreting and applying international law involves two stages-
deliberation and explanation. The process of deliberation is the more complete
stage because it includes all the reasons for a judge's decision whether or not
those reasons are articulated in the explanation of the judge's decision in a writ-
ten opinion. The processes of deliberation and explanation thus do not com-
pletely mirror one another. My argument is that international law needs religion
to provide a full justification of indeterminate international law in the delibera-
tion stage but that international law should remain indeterminate (not replace
religion) so that the official explanation or treaty provisions resulting from that
deliberation are based on noncomprehensive legal and extra-legal norms. The
first requirement applies to all interpreters of international law including judges,
legislators, foreign relations specialists, etc. The second requirement only
116. GAMWELL, supra note 22, at 139. Gamwell further clarifies that "[i]f there is no character or positive
principle of human authenticity that is valid under all historical conditions, then all valid understandings of
human authenticity must be relative to some or other specific circumstances. But, then, no moral claim could
be justified without validating moral relativism, and moral relativism is a positive claim about human authen-
ticity, the validity of which cannot be relative to specific circumstances. To assert that the moral norms of
every actual and possible human activity are in all respects relative is to make a positive claim about human
activity that is comprehensive. In other words, moral relativism is self-refuting because it implies the compre-
hensive condition that it denies, and, therefore, the denial of all comprehensive convictions prevents the valida-
tion of any moral claim at all." Id. at 139-40.
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applies to public officials who are part of the process of creating international
law either by judicial opinions, treaties, or other official expressions of interna-
tional legal norms. The first part of this Section will briefly address the first part
of this thesis. The second part will address the second requirement, and the third
part will indicate how pluralistic inclusivism provides a normative justification
for legal indeterminacy.
A. FULLY JUSTIFYING THE INTERPRETATION OF INDETERMINATE
INTERNATIONAL LAW1"'
1. Full Justification
Since all human activity implicitly or explicitly depends on a comprehensive
conviction, legal interpretation is no exception. In easy cases, the relevant posi-
tive international legal norms provide a determinate outcome without regard to
the comprehensive convictions that implicitly justify those norms. In hard cases,
however, legal interpreters must rely on extra-legal norms because hard cases
are, by definition, those cases in which the relevant sources of positive interna-
tional law do not provide a determinate outcome to the issue in question. For
example, the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights1.8 protects
the "right to self-determination" and the "inherent right to life." Does the "inher-
ent right to life" include a right to die? A majority of states in the United States
prohibit physician-assisted suicide.119 The U.S. Supreme Court has also held that
there is not a fundamental right or liberty interest to assistance in suicide protect-
ed by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 2 If the "inherent
right to life" protected by the International Convention is held to include a right
to die, do these U.S. state statutory provisions violate international law?
Alternatively, does the right to self-determination justify these statutory provi-
sions? As with the Lawal case noted in Section I,12 this conflict among rights is
not resolved by the text of the International Convention or other likely sources
of international law. The international legal norms are indeterminate.
To resolve this indeterminancy, legal interpreters must rely on extra-legal
norms such as political, historical, societal, and moral norms and determine
which extra-legal norms are appropriate. Why is one political norm decisive and
not another? Why is a historical norm, rather than a societal norm, decisive?
Why are any of these norms appropriate? In other words, a full justification
would also justify these extra-legal norms and provide reasons why one norm is
the most appropriate for justifying a particular interpretation.
117. For a much more thorough discussion of the role of religious convictions in fully justifuing judges deci-
sions in hard cases, see MODAK-TRURAN, REENCHANTING THE LAW, supra note 19, at 179-239. This analysis
also demonstrates the necessity of relying on religious convictions for fully justifying decisions in two actual
hard cases- Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) and Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery
Protective Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
118. International Covenant, supra note 69 (providing that "[a]ll peoples have the right of self-determina-
tion," that "[e]very human being has the inherent right to life," and that "[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived
of his life").
119. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
120. Id. at 735.
121. See supra text accompanying notes 67-75.
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If the political, historical, societal, and moral norms in question are noncom-
prehensive extra-legal norms, they will not fully justify a decision. A full justifi-
cation in hard cases requires legal interpreters to rely on a particular type of
extra-legal norm-religious convictions about authentic human existence.
Religious convictions are explicit comprehensive convictions which provide the
comprehensive condition of validity for all normative thinking. Religious con-
victions should thus inform legal deliberations in hard cases in several ways.
First, any noncomprehensive extra-legal norm relied on must be justified by a
religious conviction. Justifying extra-legal norms requires determining that the
norms in question would positively contribute to authentic human existence in
the context of the case at issue. Second, the choice among extra-legal norms
should also be justified by determining which norm or norms best contributes to
authentic human existence. In addition, only religious convictions that have
been critically validated should be relied on. Consequently, in deliberating about
hard cases, legal interpreters should fully justify their decisions by relying on
their religious convictions (which they have self-critically determined to be true)
to justify all noncomprehensive extra-legal norms and the choice among them.
Although he has a much different conception of what fully justifying judicial
decisions in hard cases entails, Dworkin makes a similar point when he argues
that
[a]ny practical legal argument, no matter how detailed and limit-
ed, assumes the kind of abstract foundation jurisprudence offers,
and when rival foundations compete, a legal argument assumes
one and rejects others. So any judge's opinion is itself a piece of
legal philosophy, even when the philosophy is hidden and the
visible argument is dominated by citation and lists of facts.
Jurisprudence is the general part of adjudication, silent prologue
to any decision at law.122
In my terms, any practical legal argument in a hard case presupposes a compre-
hensive conviction about authentic human existence. A choice among extra-
legal norms is either fully justified based on an explicit comprehensive convic-
tion (i.e., a religious conviction about authentic human existence) or blindly
based on an implicit comprehensive conviction. Comprehensive convictions are
the "hidden" and "silent prologue" to any judicial decision in a hard case.
2. Caveat: The Role of Fully Justified Noncomprehensive Norms
My argument that a full justification of an interpretation of hard cases
requires relying on comprehensive or religious convictions, however, needs a
caveat because this claim is not as demanding as it may initially seem. I am not
arguing that in deliberating about every hard case, legal interpreters must specify
a full justification of their decisions. My claim is more modest than this. What
122. RONALD DwoRXdN, LAW'S EMPIRE 90 (1986).
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responsible legal interpretation requires is that interpreters have, at some point,
fully justified all the extra-legal norms they rely on to decide hard cases. For
example, in a hard case dealing with conflicting precedent, the judge must
choose which line of precedent to follow. The law does not tell the judge which
direction to go or which path to take. The judge must rely on extra-legal norms
to determine which precedent to follow. If the extra-legal norms are noncompre-
hensive such as political, historical, social, or moral norms, then the judge will
have to justify these noncomprehensive extra-legal norms in accordance with her
comprehensive conviction. The judge can do this either during, prior to, or
alongside of the process of deliberating about this hard case. In other words,
even if the judge does not fully justify these noncomprehensive extra-legal
norms during her deliberation about the case, she can rely on these norms if they
have been fully justified prior to or alongside of her deliberation in that case.
This raises the question of where these noncomprehensive norms come from
and how legal interpreters fully justify them prior to and alongside of their inter-
pretation. Specifying noncomprehensive norms is part of determining the nature
of authentic human existence. Religious or comprehensive convictions attempt
to order and organize all of life around a comprehensive purpose. This includes
the moral, political, social, economic, and legal dimensions of life, and it
requires relating that comprehensive purpose to the particular circumstances of
each individual's life. Noncomprehensive norms such as "obey your parents,"
"do not lie," "promote democratic government," and "pursue justice" are part of
the specification of authentic human existence which depend upon a religious or
comprehensive conviction. These noncomprehensive norms are essential for
organizing and leading a self-reflective life because they allow us to make deci-
sions without ascending to the comprehensive level of reflection in every deci-
sion we make. They also allow us to focus on the particular circumstances of a
normative issue. Most practical normative deliberation focuses on getting the
facts straight and deciding what to do based on the most appropriate noncompre-
hensive norm. Most of our normative thinking occurs at this level and ascends
to the comprehensive order of reflection only in hard cases where the noncom-
prehensive norms are indeterminate.
One of the major functions that religious traditions have performed for their
followers is to specify the noncomprehensive norms that promote living life
authentically and to provide the comprehensive or religious justification for these
noncomprehensive norms. In the Christian tradition, one of the main tasks of
practical and moral theology has to do with specifying for believers what non-
comprehensive norms are essential for living the Christian Life in a historically
appropriate manner.12 For example, the Papal Encyclicals have addressed mat-
123. In discussing the nature of theology in general and Christian theology as a particular example of theo-
logical reflection, Schubert Ogden argues that "[alithough theology is a single moment of reflection, it has
three distinct moments which allow for its differentiation into the interrelated disciplines of historical, system-
atic, and practical theology." OGDEN, ON THEOLOGY, supra note 28, at 7. Practical theology, in its Christian
form, can be broadly understood "as reflective understanding of the responsibilities of Christian witness as
such in the present situation." Id. at 13-14. He further claims that practical theology can also be more narrow-
ly understood as focusing on the "explicit witness of faith" in the specific religious forms and practices of the
representative Christian church. Id at 98-101. By contrast, moral theology focuses on the "implicit witness of
faith" constituted by the actions of each individual Christian and formulates general principles to inform all
Christian praxis. Id. See also DON S. BROWNING, A FUNDAMENTAL PRACTICAL THEOLOGY: DESCRIPTIVE AND
STRATEGIC PROPOSALS (1991); TRACY, supra note 34, at 237-250.
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ters of moral theology such as abortion, artificial conception, economic exploita-
tion, and euthanasia.124 The World Council of Churches has likewise addressed
issues such as racism, sexism, and defining a just, participatory, and sustainable
society."' In the Jewish tradition, the classic example of the specification of
noncomprehensive norms is the Jewish Talmud. The Talmud is a great com-
pendium of Jewish law and includes commentary on the Jewish law by esteemed
Babylonian and Palestinian rabbis. 26 These laws address very particular aspects
of daily life such as, "LOVE WORK, HATE LORDSHIP, AND SEEK NO
INTIMACY WITH THE RULING POWERS." '27 Furthermore, given that all
explicit comprehensive convictions are religious convictions, any tradition of
comprehensive reflection, such as comprehensive liberalism, could serve the
function of a religious tradition by specifying and fully justifying noncompre-
hensive norms. 28 Religious traditions thus provide valuable assistance to their
followers in specifying and fully justifying noncomprehensive norms to help
them deal with important moral, political, social, and legal issues.
With respect to legal interpretation, two things need to be emphasized. First,
a full justification of noncomprehensive extra-legal norms can be done prior to,
alongside of and during the interpretation of the law in hard cases. The non-
comprehensive extra-legal norms relied on do not just magically appear during
the interpretive process. We all inherit a plethora of noncomprehensive norms
from our culture, including the religious traditions which are part of that cul-
ture. 29 In the process of maturation, self-reflective individuals reflect on these
inherited noncomprehensive norms and come to terms with them. Religious tra-
ditions provide assistance in this process both by specifying noncomprehensive
norms which aid adherents in living life authentically and by fully justifying
these noncomprehensive norms. However, individuals must finally determine
for themselves which religious or comprehensive conviction about authentic
human existence is valid and which noncomprehensive norms can be fully justi-
124. See, e.g., Pope John Paul II, Veritatis Splendor (1993), in READINGS IN CHRISTLAN ETHICS: A HISTORICAL
SOURCEBOOK 307-311 (J. Philip Wogaman & Douglas M. Strong eds., 1996). This collection of readings
includes a wide array of works in Christian ethics from early Christianity up to very recent works.
125. World Council of Churches, Reports from Periodic Assemblies (1948, 1954, 1961, 1983, 1991), in
READINGS IN CHRISTIAN ETHICS: A HISTORICAL SOURCEBOOK 315-340 (J. Philip Wogaman & Douglas M.
Strong eds., 1996).
126. See, e.g., THE LIVING TALMuD: THE WISDOM OF THE FATHERS (Judah Goldin ed. & trans. 1957).
127. Id. at 62.
128. See RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 15.
129. The work on "social norms" in law and society and law and economics has been helpful in identifying
that the obligations generated by social norms determine behavior in addition to or instead of the law. See
Richard H. McAdams, Comment: Accounting for Norms, 1997 WIs. L. REV. 625, 632; Robert C. Ellickson,
Law and Economics Discovers Social Norms, 27 J. LEGAL STuD. 537 (1998) (Symposium on Social Norms,
Social Meaning, and the Economic Analysis of Law). However, the discussion of "social norms" in legal theo-
ry and especially in the economic analysis of law has tended to focus on a descriptive analysis of the role of
social norms in regulating behavior along with law, the market, and "architecture." See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig,
The New Chicago School, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 661 (1998) (Symposium on Social Norms, Social Meaning, and
The Economic Analysis of Law). Social norms are taken as a given (like preferences) and used to explain
behavior in addition to legal norms, as an alternative to an explanation based on legal norms, and as a response
to legal norms. By contrast, I am focusing on the normative question of how extra-legal norms, whatever their
source, should be justified. The inquiry is not an empirical or descriptive account of how extra-legal norms
influence judicial decision making in hard cases but a normative account of how extra-legal norms that are
inherited from our culture should be justified or legitimatized. The question is what validates or justifies the
extra-legal norms that are required for judges to decide hard cases.
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fled by their comprehensive conviction. In addition, this is a life-long task.
Self-reflective individuals continually reexamine both whether their noncompre-
hensive norms can be fully justified by their comprehensive or religious convic-
tions about authentic human existence and whether their comprehensive convic-
tions about authentic human existence are authentic or valid. To the extent indi-
viduals have been self-reflective, they come to the process of legal interpretation
bench with a body of noncomprehensive extra-legal norms that have been fully
justified ahead of time, and they continue to reflect on these noncomprehensive
convictions alongside of or outside of the interpretive process. Certain hard
cases may cause or prompt further reflection about the noncomprehensive extra-
legal norms they thought were fully justified, but in most cases, the full justifica-
tion of these noncomprehensive extra-legal norms has occurred prior to, and con-
tinues to occur alongside of, the interpretative process.
Second, once an interpreter has determined that certain noncomprehensive,
extra-legal norms are fully justified by her comprehensive conviction, she can
rely on these noncomprehensive extra-legal norms in subsequent hard cases for
fully justifying her decisions without explicitly ascending to her comprehensive
conviction. Future ascent may be unusual or rare. Unless something about a
subsequent case calls their validity into question, these previously justified non-
comprehensive extra-legal norms will suffice for deciding subsequent hard cases.
The occasional nature of the ascent to comprehensive convictions may be one of
the reasons that this ascent is absent from most accounts of legal interpretation.
Once noncomprehensive extra-legal norms about politics, morality, economics,
etc. have been fully justified, this prior process of justification may not be con-
sciously linked with the process of legal interpretation in hard cases. In addition,
individuals continue to justify extra-legal norms alongside of and during inter-
pretation in hard cases. If legal interpreters do so during their deliberation, they
are self-aware that they are relying on noncomprehensive extra-legal norms that
must be fully justified during their deliberations. If full justification is done
along side of the interpretive process, legal interpreters may be fully justifying
noncomprehensive extra-legal norms without connecting this process to the full
justification of their decisions during legal interpretation. Ideally, individuals
would recognize that both of these processes are essential to a full justification of
their decisions in hard cases. Nevertheless, their decisions would still be fully
justified even if these processes were performed separately and were not recog-
nized as being connected. As a result, although requiring legal interpreters to
justify their decisions fully, this model of legal interpretation does not require
that the full justification of the relevant noncomprehensive extra-legal norms
during the deliberations about each hard case.
B. Why Shouldn't International Law Adopt a Comprehensive Conviction?
Given that international law does not include an establishment clause like the
First Amendment of the United States Constitution, why shouldn't international
law attempt to adopt a comprehensive conviction, like comprehensive liberalism,
to decrease legal indeterminancy? Or, why shouldn't international law replace
religion? The following will explore three possible arguments.
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1. Freedom of Religion and Lack of Consensus
Both the international recognition of religious freedom and the lack of con-
sensus about comprehensive convictions pose possible obstacles to establishing
an official international religion or international conception of authentic human
existence. The "freedom of religion" has been recognized by most treaties on
international human rights and would arguably be infringed by the establishment
of an official international religion."' By denying some people the right to rely
on their own religious convictions in hard cases, the law would be interfering
with their religious freedom. However, many of these treaties further provide
that the "[f]reedom to manifest one's religion or beliefs may be subject only to
such limitations as are prescribed by law and are necessary to protect public
safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of oth-
ers." '131 In the United States, the same concept has supported severely limiting
the religious actions or practices by generally applicable laws that are rationally
related to a legitimate governmental purpose. The rationale for these restrictions
on religious freedom have been justified by the claim that people still have the
right to hold their religious beliefs, even though acting on those beliefs is severe-
ly restricted by these generally applicable laws.132 If the comprehensive convic-
tion is considered a generally applicable law that is rationally related to a legiti-
mate governmental purpose (i.e., reducing legal indeterminancy), then this argu-
ment will fail to provide a basis for prohibiting the establishment of an official
international religion. Those with contrary religious convictions can still believe
in those convictions, but they cannot act in a manner contrary to this generally
applicable law (i.e., they cannot rely on them for fully justifying decisions in
hard cases). The application of U.S. law to this situation may be weakened by
the fact that the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution has both a Free
Exercise Clause and an Establishment Clause, while international treaties only
mention the freedom of religion. This difference may result in interpreting the
freedom of religion to include the prohibition against establishing an official
international religion because establishment would interfere with the free exer-
cise of those holding religious convictions contrary to the established religion.
Given the substantial indeterminacy of the meaning of the freedom of religion,
however, the freedom of religion does not seem to be a firm basis for prohibiting
the establishment of an international religion.
130. See, e.g., International Covenant, supra note 69, at art. 18(1) (recognizing "the right to freedom of
thought, conscience and religion").
131. Id. at 18(3).
132. In Reynolds v. United States. 98 U.S. 145 (1878), the Supreme Court held that the free exercise clause
did not protect Mormon religious practice of polygamy. The Court made the now famous distinction that
"[l]aws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and
opinions, they may with practices." Id. at 166. The key question thus becomes whether the religious practice
in question is one that is protected by the free exercise clause. Relying on this distinction, the Court recently
refused to protect the Native American religious practice of smoking peyote under the free exercise clause
because the criminal sanctions against the use of illegal drugs while working for the State of Oregon was a
generally applicable law that was rationally related to a legitimate government purpose (controlling illegal drug
use). Employment Division, Oregon Department of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990). See
also Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986) (refusing to protect wearing yarmulke while on active mili-
tary duty).
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Nevertheless, from a practical point of view, it is unlikely that there would
be sufficient consensus to support a treaty or convention adopting comprehen-
sive liberalism. Why would those with different religious convictions, which are
the comprehensive condition for all normative validity, agree to replace their
religious convictions with an official international religion? Since this seems
unlikely, this question may be more of an academic concern than a real issue.
2. Pluralistic Inclusivism
The strongest argument against establishing an international religion has to
do with religious pluralism. Given that religious convictions can be critically
validated, Ogden could be read to suggest that there is only one true religion
which can be arrived at by critical reflection. If this were the case, the interna-
tional community could establish this religion so that the law would include a
comprehensive justification. This reading, however, would be seriously mis-
guided. To the contrary, Ogden maintains that the debate about religious plural-
ism has been mistaken because it has proceeded from the assumption that there
is either one true religion (monism) or that there are many equally true religions
(pluralism). He argues that religious monism comes in two varieties: exclu-
sivism and inclusivism. For example, in its Christian form, exclusivists claim
that there is "no salvation outside of the Church" or "no salvation outside of
Christianity." '33 By contrast, Christian inclusivists argue that "the possibility of
salvation uniquely constituted by the event of Jesus Christ is somehow made
available to each and every human being without exception [usually through the
fragmentary explication of the true religion (Christianity) by other religions] and,
therefore, is exclusive of no one unless she or he excludes herself or himself
from its effect by a free and responsible decision to reject it." '134 The alternative
usually proposed to these two forms of monism is pluralism. Pluralists maintain
"not only that there can be many true religions but there actually are."' On this
account, all religions are equally true, and one religion cannot be shown to be
true and another false.
Conversely, Ogden contends that religious convictions are capable of critical
validation. Some religious convictions are capable of critical validation by the-
ology and philosophy and others are not. This seems to suggest religious
monism, but Ogden argues for another option which he calls pluralistic inclu-
sivism. He maintains that the logical contradictory to religious monism "is not
that there actually are many true religions, but only that there can be." 3 ' In
other words, more than one religion may be capable of critical validation. More
than one religion may be the true reflective understanding of our basic existential
faith. Also, religious convictions can be modified and corrected based on further
reflection and based on what is learned from dialogue with other religions. The
pursuit of religious truth is never complete. Through ongoing reflection and
133. OGDEN, supra note 20, at 28-29.
134. Id. at 31.
135. Id. at 27.
136. Id. at 83.
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encounters with other religions, the possibility for improvement is ever present.
Consequently, even if a religion could be shown to be more true than others,
Ogden would oppose the establishment of an official religion by the international
community. Establishing an official religion would cut off the opportunity for
further improvement and refinement of religious truth. It would stifle the pursuit
of religious truth and jeopardize further progress from subsequent rational reflec-
tion and dialogue among those holding a plurality of religious convictions.
3. Consequences for International Law
Assuming Ogden's arguments for his account of justifying religious convic-
tions and pluralistic inclusivism succeed, there are two significant implications
for legal interpretation in hard cases. First, all comprehensive or religious con-
victions cannot be presumed to be equally true. Legal interpreters must validate
their religious convictions before relying on them in hard cases. At the very
least, they must determine that these religious convictions are fully reflective-
credible to common human existence and reason.137 Once this has been done,
they are warranted in relying on those religious convictions for fully justifying
their interpretations of international law in hard cases.
However, this does not mean that legal interpreters must become theolo-
gians. They are not expected to produce a systematic theological defense of their
religious convictions. Rather, they may meet this burden in several other ways.
They may rely on the theological justifications of a theologian or on the official
doctrine of a religious tradition as long as they examine this theological justifica-
tion and conclude that this account is fully reflective. Also, many individuals
have likely been reflecting on their religious convictions, to some extent, their
entire lives. Once they have satisfied themselves that their religious convictions
are fully reflective, this validation will suffice unless something calls this conclu-
sion into question. In either case, legal interpreters will not usually be validating
their religious convictions during their deliberations about hard cases. This vali-
dation will likely occur prior to their deliberations. If so, their focus in hard
cases will not be on validating their religious convictions but on justifying non-
comprehensive norms and the choice among them. If not, legal interpreters must
critically validate their religious convictions during their deliberations and
before relying on these religious convictions for fully justifying their decisions.
As a result, if they follow this process of critically validating their religious con-
victions, their religious convictions will provide a rational justification of the
international law even in hard cases.
Second, pluralistic inclusivism provides an additional justification for the
prohibition against writing religious convictions into official legal opinions or
treaties. Judges and other public officials should not write their religious convic-
tions into the law not because religious convictions are nonrational and incapable
of critical validation but because religious convictions are always open to further
137. For further discussion of Ogden's account of the critical validation of religious convictions, see
MODAK-TRuRAN, REENCHANTING THE LAW, supra note 19, at 280-88.
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refinement and validation. If an official religious justification for the law is
adopted as part of international law, this would establish that religious justifica-
tion as presumptively true. This would stifle the pursuit of religious truth in sev-
eral ways. The first problem is that legal interpreters are not theologians or
philosophers. Most of them are not trained to provide a systematic account of
their religious convictions even if the religious convictions they hold are true.
Any religious convictions written in official opinions would likely be inaccurate-
ly or inartfully expressed. In addition, any official recognition of a religious
conviction by the international community would be problematic. The act of
establishing an official religious justification of the law would tend to isolate that
justification from critique and to make the practical decision based on that reli-
gious justification difficult to modify. That religious justification would function
like precedent; it would have presumptive validity. Those challenging it would
not only have the burden of showing that an alternative religious justification
was true and that the state religious justification was false, but they would also
have to persuade those in power to change this religious justification.
For example, in a recent child custody case in Alabama, Chief Justice Moore
wrote a concurring opinion which stated that "[h]omosexual conduct is, and has
been, considered abhorrent, immoral, detestable, a crime against nature, and a
violation of the laws of nature and of nature's God upon which this Nation and
our laws are predicated." '138 He further cited Genesis, Leviticus, and St. Thomas
Aquinas to support his claim that homosexuality is "inherently evil." '39 He
argues that "[n]atural law forms the basis of the common law" and that "[n]atural
law is the law of nature and of nature's God as understood by men through rea-
son, but aided by direct revelation found in the Holy Scriptures." 4 ' Based on
William Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, he claims that
"because our reason is full of error, the most certain way to ascertain the law of
nature is through direct revelation.""14 He argues that "[h]omosexuality is
strongly condemned in the common law because it violates both natural and
revealed law."'42 He then held that there should be "a strong presumption of
unfitness" against homosexual parents for custody of their children. 43
In the international context, a judge with conservative Christian beliefs simi-
lar to Chief Justice Moore's could interpret treaty provisions like those found in
the International Covenant to support this same strong presumption of unfitness.
For instance, the International Covenant protects "[t]he right of men and women
of marriageable age to marry and to found a family."' " A conservative Christian
judge could infer from this provision that families ought not to be constituted by
same-sex couples. In fulfilling the Covenant's requirement that "[i]n the case of
dissolution, provisions shall be made for the necessary protection of any chil-
dren,"4  this judge could conclude that the International Covenant presumes that
138. ExParte H.H., 830 So. 2d 21, 26 (Ala. 2002).
139. Id. at 33.
140. Id. at 32.
141. Id. (citing IWilliam Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England 42).
142. Id. at 33.
143. Id. at 38.
144. International Covenant, supra note 69, at art. 23(2).
145. Id. at art. 23(4).
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a child would be better off with a heterosexual parent rather than a homosexual
parent. If this presumption was given a Christian justification in a written judi-
cial opinion, challengers of this presumption would then have to persuade subse-
quent judges both that the presumption was wrong and that the religious justifi-
cation was wrong. Further, the challenger would not only have to show that the
Christian argument against homosexuality was flawed but also that Christianity
itself was flawed. If Buddhism could be shown to be true and Christianity false,
the challenger would then have to persuade some judges who were Christian that
their Christian religious convictions were not true. Even if the Buddhist was
right, the practical difficulty of convincing the Christian judge to recognize his
error would be immense.
To the contrary, pluralist inclusivism requires that the law should only be
implicitly informed by religious convictions that judges or other public officials
have critically validated. This requirement prevents the state or the international
community from ruling out religious convictions ahead of time. By not allowing
an establishment of religion, the debate about which religious convictions pro-
vide the fully reflective account of authentic human existence can continue.
Also, this requirement shifts to individuals the responsibility for critically vali-
dating their religious convictions before relying on them for fully justifying their
decisions in hard cases. At the same time, this requirement allows for the full
justification of the law even though the state does not establish an official reli-
gion. Full justification of the law by individual legal interpreters would likely
result in a plurality of comprehensive convictions implicitly informing the law."6
Consequently, by following the requirements of pluralistic inclusivism, legal
interpreters would reenchant the law by giving the law a rational religious justi-
fication in their deliberations without establishing that religious justification as
part of the law in their written opinions.
C. Justifying Legal Indeterminacy
Given this argument, international law should always include only noncom-
prehensive legal and extra-legal norms. In the case of judges, judicial opinions
should only partially justify judges' decisions. Legal justifications in written
opinions should be composed entirely of noncomprehensive norms because plu-
ralistic inclusivism and the freedom of religion prohibit judges or other public
officials from providing a full justification of legal norms. Noncomprehensive
legal norms can only imply a comprehensive conviction, or more likely, a plural-
ity of comprehensive convictions. In other words, the law should be indetermi-
nate in the sense that legal norms should not be fully justified. International law
should not establish an official religion.
Mandating legal indeterminacy, however, means that judges and other public
officials will not be constrained by the law, which raises "the specter that judicial
decision making is often or always illegitimate." '147 Ronald Dworkin has argued
146. Similarly, Jean Bethke Elshtain has argued that "a variety of norms and rules are constitutive of plural
communities and that a democratic polity has an enormous stake in keeping such plurality alive. For this is the
only way to keep democratic politics alive." Jean Elshtain, The Question Concerning Authority, in RELIGION
AN) CONTEMPORARY LIBERALISM 253, 254 (Paul J. Weithman ed., 1997).
147. See, e.g., Kress, supra note 38, at 200, 203.
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that "indeterminacy is a substantive view to be ranked alongside the other sub-
stantive views." '148 He maintains that "claims of indeterminacy are not true by
default: they need if not argument, which may not be available at any impressive
length, at least a basis in more abstract instincts or convictions." '49
To respond to this argument, this Section argues that pluralistic inclusivism
provides a normative justification for legal indeterminacy in two senses. First,
pluralistic inclusivism requires that the law is always indeterminate in the sense
that the law cannot include a full justification of legal norms because that would
require writing religious convictions into the law. I will refer to this as compre-
hensive legal indeterminancy. Pluralistic inclusivism mandates that official writ-
ten opinions in both easy and hard cases are indeterminate in this sense. Judges
and other public officials are prohibited from fully justifying their decisions. For
example, in an easy case involving evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that
someone intentionally killed another person, the statutory prohibition of murder
is determinate (in the narrow sense described below) and would warrant a con-
viction. The judge can apply that statutory prohibition without fully justifying
the prohibition of murder either in her deliberation or in her written opinion.
Although the murder statute has not been fully justified, the judge (and the legis-
lature) are prohibited from referencing the Christian Bible, the Torah, the Koran,
or any other religious convictions to provide a full justification of that statute.
The possible comprehensive justifications must remain implicit. In hard cases,
judges must rely on their comprehensive convictions for fully justifying their
deliberations, but likewise, those comprehensive convictions should not be part
of their written opinions. Pluralistic inclusivism prohibits explicit full justifica-
tion in both easy and hard cases. Therefore, international law must only provide
a partial justification for legal prohibitions and must exhibit comprehensive legal
indeterminacy.
Pluralistic inclusivism's justification of comprehensive legal indeterminacy
also indirectly justifies legal indeterminacy in the narrow sense assumed at the
beginning of this inquiry. In this sense, the law is indeterminate such that there
are hard cases where the relevant international legal norms do not provide deter-
minate answers to legal issues. I will refer to this as noncomprehensive legal
indeterminacy. Pluralistic inclusivism indirectly justifies noncomprehensive
legal indeterminacy because noncomprehensive legal indeterminacy is a function
of comprehensive legal indeterminacy. Comprehensive legal indeterminacy
ensures that noncomprehensive legal indeterminancy will persist in the legal sys-
tem because the law cannot include a comprehensive justification for the law
which legal interpreters could rely on to resolve hard cases. This produces non-
comprehensive legal indeterminacy in two ways. The first way that comprehen-
sive legal indeterminacy produces noncomprehensive legal indeterminacy has to
do with the absence of a comprehensive justification within the law to resolve
hard cases. To understand how this occurs, the sources of noncomprehensive
legal indeterminacy need to be identified. Noncomprehensive legal indetermina-
cy arises for many reasons but can be classified into two broad types-intention-
148. Ronald Dworkin, Indeterminacy and Law, in POSITIVISM TODAY 1, 5 (Stephen Guest ed., 1996).
149. Id.
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al and unintentional. Sometimes the law intentionally includes indeterminate
standards, such as the reasonable person standard, that provide for judicial dis-
cretion. These standards allow legal interpreters the flexibility to determine what
is required under the particular circumstances of the case because the law cannot
ahead of time anticipate with sufficient precision what would be reasonable
under the circumstances of every case."' Noncomprehensive legal indetermina-
cy also arises from unintentional sources such as ambiguous and conflicting
legal norms. Despite judges' and other public officials' best efforts, these unin-
tentional sources of noncomprehensive legal indeterminacy will persist.
However, both intentional and unintentional noncomprehensive legal indetermi-
nacy could be resolved from within the law if the law included a comprehensive
justification (i.e., a comprehensive condition of normative validity).5 With an
established comprehensive justification, the law would provide a comprehensive
norm that could be used to resolve conflicts between norms, eliminate ambigui-
ty, and aid judges in discerning how intentionally indeterminate standards should
be applied in the context of a particular case. Despite these benefits, pluralistic
inclusivism prohibits establishing this comprehensive justification or conviction
and mandates comprehensive legal indeterminacy. As a result, noncomprehen-
sive legal indeterminacy cannot be resolved from within the law because that
requires establishing a comprehensive conviction which is contrary to the
requirements of pluralistic inclusivism.
In addition, comprehensive legal indeterminacy produces noncomprehensive
legal indeterminacy because judges and other public officials are permitted to
justify their decisions in hard cases based on their own comprehensive convic-
tions. In other words, comprehensive legal indeterminacy enhances noncompre-
150. The practical necessity of intentional legal indeterminacy has been long recognized by philosophers.
For example, Aristotle claims that some matters do not lend themselves to "a general principle embracing all
the particulars" and must be decided by judicial decree. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHics 1282b:5 (William.
D. Ross trans. & rev. by J. L. Ackrill and J. 0. Urmson) in 2 THE COMPLETE WORKS OF ARISTOTLE (Jonathan
Barnes ed., rev. Oxford trans., 1984). Aristotle notes that "it is impossible that all things should be precisely
set down in writing; for enactments must be universal, but actions are concerned with particulars." Id. at
1269a:10-1 1. His most extensive discussion of this idea is in the Nicomachean Ethics with respect to equity
which he calls "a corrective of legal justice." For further discussion of Aristotle's understanding of equity, see
Mark C. Modak-Truran, Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial Virtue, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 249,
270-76 (2000).
151. Ronald Dworkin's interpretative theory suggests something like this solution. Dworkin claims that
judges must try "to find, in some coherent set of principles about people's rights and duties, the best construc-
tive interpretation of the political structure and legal doctrine of their community." DwORKrN, LAW'S EMPIRE,
supra note 122, at 255. The best construction thus includes "convictions about both fit and justification" and is
the "right answer" in that case. Id. Dworkin further claims that "in a modem, developed, and complex [legal]
system" n tie with respect to fit would be "so rare as to be exotic." RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF
PRiNCIPLE 143 (1985) (emphasis added). He further maintains that "[t]here seems to be no room here for the
ordinary idea of a tie. If there is no right answer in a hard case, this must be in virtue of some more problemat-
ic type of indeterminacy or incommensurability in moral theory." Id. at 144. Dworkin's interpretative method
posits that there is some determinative notion of "political morality" (justification or purpose) that along with
precedent (fit) could produce this legal determinacy. See DWORIN, LAW'S EMPIRE, supra note 122, at 225-58.
For this "political morality" to provide a full justification in all cases, however, it must be a comprehensive
conviction. Otherwise, there would be cases where this political morality was indeterminate or where there
was a conflict among the principles of political morality that could not be resolved without a comprehensive
conviction. Thus, although I am not able to specify the full argument here, this would mean that Dworkin's
interpretative theory would require establishing a comprehensive justification for the law in violation of the
pluralistic inclusivism.
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hensive legal indeterminacy because judges and other public officials can draw
on a large number of comprehensive convictions for fully justifying their inter-
pretation of hard cases. These comprehensive justifications are competing with
one another to shape the law in often conflicting ways. This occurs because dis-
agreement about comprehensive convictions translates into disagreements about
which noncomprehensive norms, including different noncomprehensive legal
norms, are fully justified. Consequently, judges and other public officials will
resolve similar hard cases differently and articulate different interpretations of
the law. The law will thus embody conflicting legal norms and be indeterminate.
For example, different religious and comprehensive convictions about
authentic human existence support different conceptions of the right to marry.
The Netherlands has recently enacted a statute providing that "[a] marriage can
be contracted by two persons of different sex or of the same sex.""1 2 This expan-
sion of the traditional definition of marriage implies a comprehensive conviction
or convictions that accept homosexual marriage as part of authentic human exis-
tence. This new definition, however, conflicts with the definition of marriage in
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, which only recognizes that "[m]en and women of marriageable age
have the right to marry and to found a family, according to the national laws
governing the exercise of this right.""1 3 The European Convention implies dif-
ferent comprehensive convictions that include only marriage between a man and
a woman as coincident with authentic human existence. One issue for the
Netherlands is whether other European Community members will recognize
same-sex marriages and accord them the same rights, such as adoption, that they
have in the Netherlands. Since international law has not officially adopted one
of these comprehensive convictions, there are different comprehensive convic-
tions implicitly informing the law and supporting conflicting definitions of mar-
riage.
Without an established religion, there is no comprehensive justification with-
in the law that can be evoked to settle this disagreement and eliminate the non-
comprehensive legal indeterminacy. The law does not include a comprehensive
condition for legal validity. 4 Even if a judge's opinion or a new treaty makes
the law more determinate, they cannot provide a comprehensive condition for
legal validity within the law. As future hard cases arise, the law will still not
include a full justification which would eliminate the need for legal interpreters
to rely on their own comprehensive convictions. Without establishing a compre-
hensive condition of legal validity, the law will continue to include intentional
hard cases involving indeterminate standards and unintentional hard cases where
152. Nancy G. Maxwell, Opening Civil Marriage to Same-Gender Couples: A Netherlands-United States
Comparison, 18 ARIZ. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 141, 155 (2001) (quoting Book 1, art. 30 of the Netherlands Civil
Code).
153. European Convention, supra note 61, at art. 12. Cf International Covenant, supra note 69, at art. 23
(providing for the "right of men and women of marriageable age to marry").
154. Critical legal scholars have argued similarly that the law is incoherent because it does not include a
metaprinciple to resolve legal indeterminacy. Ken Kress, Legal Indeterminacy, 77 CAL. L. REv. 283, 331-34
(1989). However, Ken Kress points out that they further argue that "we cannot provide, in advance, fully
explicit metaprinciples to resolve all conflicts accurately describes a limitation of all rules of behavior, not just
legal theory." Id. at 334.
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ambiguous or conflicting legal norms will be inadequate to resolve legal dis-
putes. Consequently, pluralistic inclusivism would not support establishing an
official comprehensive justification for the law and provides a normative justifi-
cation for comprehensive legal indeterminacy and the noncomprehensive legal
indeterminacy resulting from it.
Furthermore, my second thesis-that judges and other public officials should
only partially justify their decisions in their written opinions by explaining their
decisions in terms of legal norms and noncomprehensive extra-legal norms-
attempts to take the normative implications of pluralistic inclusivism into
account. Judges and other public officials should not attempt to eliminate com-
prehensive indeterminancy by establishing a comprehensive doctrine like com-
prehensive liberalism. Further, legal interpreters should react to intentional and
unintentional noncomprehensive indeterminancy by relying on the comprehen-
sive conviction they hold to be true to provide a full justification for the extra-
legal norms they rely on and the choice among them. On this account, the full
justification of international law in hard cases is shifted from the law to legal
interpreters, and a plurality of comprehensive convictions implicitly justifies the
law fully without inappropriately establishing a religion.
IV. CONSEQUENCES OF REENCHANTING INTERNATIONAL LAW
What are the consequences of religious convictions informing the interpreta-
tion of international law? This Section will focus on two important conse-
quences of reenchanting the law. First, one of the central consequences of reen-
chanting international law is to see that much of the disagreement about the
interpretation of hard cases in international law does not occur at the level of the
law. It is not that some interpreters "correctly" interpret the legal norm, and oth-
ers are mistaken. In hard cases, the law itself does not provide a dispositive
answer to the dispute. Even if legal interpreters are completely clear about the
parameters of the law they are interpreting and deal effectively with the treaties,
international custom, precedent, or other international legal norms in dispute,
they may disagree about what extra-legal norms are controlling. Adjudicating
these competing extra-legal norms cannot be done without justifying those
norms and the choice among them. If interpreters hold different religious con-
victions, they may fully justify contrary extra-legal norms based on those reli-
gious convictions. This is not to say that one or both of the legal interpreters
could not be mistaken about the validity of his or her religious convictions. That
may very well be the case. Also, some interpreters may choose without explicit-
ly relying on religious convictions so that their choices only imply comprehen-
sive convictions. The disagreement among these legal interpreters, however, is
not about the "law" but about which comprehensive conviction about authentic
human existence is true. This disagreement is at a higher level of reflection and
cannot be resolved by focusing on legal norms and noncomprehensive extra-
legal norms. To resolve this disagreement, the debate should turn to the compre-
hensive convictions that justify these different decisions. Reflection on this level
of justification may disclose mistakes in the process of fully justifying different
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interpretations or that some interpreters were relying on an unwarranted compre-
hensive conviction.
In addition, contrary to popular belief, reliance on explicit comprehensive or
religious convictions in interpreting hard cases increases rather than decreases
rational legal interpretation and has a disciplining effect on legal interpretation.
Rather than blindly assuming that their decisions are justified,155 legal inter-
preters fully justify the noncomprehensive extra-legal norms they rely on when
interpreting indeterminate international legal norms. This entails justifying all
the noncomprehensive extra-legal norms they rely on and the choice among
them. They don't merely assume that these extra-legal norms are justified and
that the choice among them is self-evident. Further, results-oriented or instru-
mental interpretation is prohibited. Contrary to political realism, outcomes can-
not be embraced merely because they are politically desirable and/or expedient.
Legal interpreters cannot conveniently rationalize their decisions in hard cases
by arbitrarily choosing extra-legal norms to support desired outcomes. They
cannot rely on noncomprehensive extra-legal norms that are inconsistent with
their religious convictions. In their deliberations about hard cases, legal inter-
preters must determine how the desired outcome connects to noncomprehensive
extra-legal norms. In turn, those noncomprehensive extra-legal norms and the
choice among them must be fully justified by a religious conviction that has been
critcally validated. This process of full justification in judicial deliberation
should deter, rather than permit, legal interpreters from embracing outcomes that
cannot be fully justified by their religious convictions. Consequently, religious
convictions will then have a disciplining effect on judicial decision making and
require legal interpretation to become more rational.
CONCLUSION
International law's history should be rewritten.156 The conception of interna-
tional law should no longer include the myth that international law was born and
continues to function to overcome the "inadequacies of religion." International
law cannot do without religion because it is indeterminate. By focusing on the
hypothetical judicial application of international legal norms, I have attempted to
show that religious convictions are required for fully justifying the interpretation
of international law when it is indeterminate. This thesis holds true even if inter-
national law is conceived as a set of indeterminate moral, rather than legal,
norms because religious or comprehensive convictions are the comprehensive
155. There may be circumstances where a more intuitive process of judicial decision making constitutes a
second-best alternative. See Mark C. Modak-Truran, A Pragmatic Justification of the Judicial Hunch, 35 U.
RICH. L. REV. 55 (2001) (arguing that in some cases, a subjective sense of certainty and pragmatically testing
the consequences of a hunched decision (inaccordance with William James's radical empiricism) may justify
judges relying on their hunches about what the outcome of a case ought to be). Here, however, I am concerned
with an ideal normative account of how judges should proceed in justifying their decisions in hard cases.
156. For a start at rewriting this history, see Mark Weston Janis, A Sampler of Religious Experiences in
International Law, Miss. C.L. REv. (2003) (arguing that "[r]eligious principles, religious problems, and reli-
gious enthusiasts have all played profound, if sometimes little appreciated, roles in the development of interna-
tional law").
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condition of all normative validity. Consequently, after critically validating their
religious convictions, interpreters of international law in hard cases should rely
on their religious convictions to justify the extra-legal norms they rely on and the
choice among them.
In addition, international law should not attempt to replace religion. This
further means that international law should also not pursue a "cosmopolitan" or
global notion of law if this means that international law has to include a compre-
hensive conviction. Rawls's Law of Peoples attempts to avoid this problem by
specifying a notion of international law that is "political not metaphysical."
Contrary to his wishes, his legal liberalism requires the establishment of a com-
prehensive conviction in order to succeed. Only those people who accept his
comprehensive evaluation that all conceptions of the good are nonrational will
go along with this, and it makes his theory "metaphysical not political," which is
incoherent.
Finally, the requirements of pluralistic inclusivism demand that international
law not adopt a comprehensive conviction about authentic human existence as
required by legal liberalism. This would prematurely stifle the pursuit of reli-
gious truth and pose undesirable practical difficulties for legal adjudication.
International law needs to know its limits. It cannot replace religion. This
means that international law will continue to be indeterminate in both the com-
prehensive and noncomprehensive senses. Indeterminancy will be a permanent
characteristic of international law. Religious convictions will thus continue to be
needed for fully justifying the interpretation of international law in hard cases.
Religious convictions will continue to be the silent prologue to any full justifica-
tion of indeterminate international law, and they will thereby continue to reen-
chant international law.
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